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DECRIMINALIZING POLYGAMY
Casey E. Faucon*
Abstract
Polygamous families are our national outlaws. Despite the expansion
of sexual rights and marriage equality in the U.S., polygamy remains a
crime. Challenging that stigma is the Brown family, who star in the reality
TV show “Sister Wives” and who practice polygamous marriage as a tenet
of their religion. The Browns filed suit against multiple Utah state actors
in federal district court, challenging Utah’s polygamy statute as
unconstitutional in violation of their Free Exercise of Religion, substantive
Due Process, and Equal Protection rights. The district court agreed and
decriminalized informal polygamy in Utah. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit
reversed the district court on mootness grounds, displaying an inherent
reluctance to address the merits of the arguments, re-affirming outdated
misconceptions, and leaving prosecutors and polygamists in an uncertain
legal position.
This Article provides much needed clarity on the decriminalization of
polygamy to inform future litigation. This Article approaches the
decriminalization debate by re-framing the issue into its three key
considerations—the harm, the law, and the policy—that must guide the
polygamy debate moving forward. The aim is to provide a gloss over the
Brown litigation in order to draw out the harms of polygamy, the
constitutional arguments and statutory interpretation issues at stake, and
the transformative legal and theoretical social policies that could ideally
result from the polygamy debate at this moment in history.
Using this framework, this Article’s novel argument is that polygamy
bans are unconstitutional under a combination of substantive Due Process
and Free Speech grounds as they apply to the private aspects of polygamy
and the public aspects of polygamy, respectively. The Article culminates
with an idealized, mock opinion from a fictional Tenth Circuit panel in the
Brown litigation that approaches the decriminalization of polygamy using
a combination of substantive Due Process and Free Speech tenets, and not
arguments based in Free Exercise of Religion.
*
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I. INTRODUCTION
Polygamous families are our national outlaws.1 Despite the expansion of sexual
rights and marriage equality in recent decades, multi-party relationships have yet to
1

See Casey E. Faucon, Marriage Outlaws: Regulating Polygamy in America, 22 DUKE
J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1, 1–2 (2014) [hereinafter Faucon, Marriage Outlaws]. The term

2016]

DECRIMINALIZING POLYGAMY

711

shed their cultural and moralistic taboos. 2 Contributing to that stigma is the
continued criminalization of polygamous and polyamorous relationships throughout
the United States.3 In 2011, the polygamous Brown family sought to challenge our
millennia-old restrictions against multi-party marriages and brought suit against
numerous Utah state actors in federal district court, alleging that Utah’s criminal
polygamy statute was unconstitutional.4 The district court agreed and decriminalized
informal polygamy in Utah.5 This groundbreaking decision sparked a renaissance of
interest in polygamous and polyamorous relationships and the law, and the case
provides a fresh lens through which to reassess the future decriminalization of
polygamy.
To simplify a task that has mystified for decades, this Article aims to provide
clarity on the decriminalization issue and to inspire future arguments in support of
poly relationships. This Article separates the analysis into three categories that
should control the decriminalization issue—the harm, the law, and the policy. The
harm analysis contributes to the current debate on polygamy’s harms by
investigating what individual or societal harms—if any—might result if polygamy
were decriminalized. The second step focuses on the law, the substantive
constitutional arguments that might inform or dispose of whatever those alleged
harms are, as well as the statutory language required to particularly delineate
prohibited conduct from permissible conduct. The third step in the analysis discusses
the overriding social and political policies that should guide the future direction of
the decriminalization process.

“poly” includes numerous multi-party adult relationship forms, such as polygamy (the
practice of having multiple spouses), polygyny (a husband with multiple wives), polyandry
(a wife with multiple husbands), and polyamory (multi-party relationship with numerous
potential structures). See Hadar Aviram & Gwendolyn M. Leachman, The Future of
Polyamorous Marriage: Lessons from the Marriage Equality Struggle, 38 HARV. WOMEN’S
L.J. 269, 274, 297–99 (2015); Adrienne D. Davis, Regulating Polygamy: Intimacy, Default
Rules, and Bargaining for Equality, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 1966, 1966 n.27 (2010).
2
See Faucon, Marriage Outlaws, supra note 1, at 20–21; Casey E. Faucon, Polygamy
After Windsor: What’s Religion Got to Do With It?, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 471, 478–81
(2015) [hereinafter Faucon, Polygamy After Windsor].
3
See JANET BENNION, POLYGAMY IN PRIMETIME: MEDIA, GENDER, AND POLITICS IN
MORMON FUNDAMENTALISM 6 (2012) [hereinafter BENNION, POLYGAMY IN PRIMETIME];
Barbara Bradley Hagerty, Some Muslims in the U.S. Quietly Engage in Polygamy, NAT’L
PUB. RADIO (May 27, 2008), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=9085
7818 [https://perma.cc/FA59-52L3].
4
Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1176–77 (D. Utah 2013), vacated as moot,
822 F.3d 1151, 1159 (10th Cir. 2016); see John Witte, Jr., Why Two in One Flesh? The
Western Case for Monogamy Over Polygamy, 64 EMORY L.J. 1675, 1678 (2015) [hereinafter
Witte, Western Case] (“For nearly two millennia, the West has thus declared polygamy to
be a crime and has had little patience with various arguments raised in its defense.”).
5
Brown, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1234.
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This Article uses this three-step guide as a gloss over the Brown v. Buhman6
district court decision and appeal. It discusses both private and public aspects of
polygamy’s alleged harms under Brown; analyzes arguments on appeal, including
amici curiae and the Tenth Circuit’s decision; and finally, addresses alternative
approaches the Tenth Circuit could have taken in response to the district court’s
decision. Applying this framework to the Brown litigation, this Article is then the
first to argue that polygamy bans are unconstitutional based on a combination of
substantive Due Process (as it relates to the private aspects of polygamy) and Free
Speech (as it relates to the public aspects of polygamy).7 The Article then culminates
with an idealized, mock Tenth Circuit opinion in a fictionalized Brown case,
grounded in ideals of substantive Due Process and Free Speech. 8 As the actual
Brown v. Buhman litigation will suffer in terms of its long-standing impact and
legitimacy because of the Tenth Circuit’s mootness determination, the aim is that
this mock opinion will influence the future shape of arguments in favor of the
decriminalization of informal polygamy.
The family members at the heart of the Brown case, Kody Brown and his four
wives, Meri, Janelle, Christine, and Robyn,9 are members of a religious group who
practice polygamy as a tenet of their faith.10 The Browns star in the reality TV show
on The Learning Channel, “Sister Wives,” now in its sixth season.11 The purpose of
the show is to “explore[] the daily issues and realities of a plural family” and to
defend “plural families and discuss[] . . . the Browns’ religious beliefs in
polygamy.” 12 In its season five finale, “Sister Wives” grabbed over 3.4 million
viewers, shattering its previous records.13 America is tuning in.
6

947 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (D. Utah 2013).
See infra Section III.C.6. Although poly proponents have invoked Free Speech as a
grounds to decriminalize polygamy, no argument attempts to bifurcate the application of
Free Speech tenets to only the public aspects of polygamy and substantive Due Process to
only the private aspects of polygamy. See Brief of the Cato Inst. as Amicus Curiae in Support
of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 4–14, Brown v. Buhman, 822 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2016) (No. 144117); Jonathan Turley, The Loadstone Rock: The Role of Harm in the Criminalization of
Plural Unions, 64 EMORY L.J. 1905, 1923, 1935, 1937–38 (2015).
8
See infra Section IV.A.
9
Brown v. Herbert, 850 F. Supp. 2d 1240, 1244 (D. Utah 2012).
10
Brown, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1178.
11
See Sister Wives, THE LEARNING CHANNEL, http://www.tlc.com/tv-shows/sisterwives/ [https://perma.cc/52N8-XQBC].
12
Brown, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1178. The family members routinely participate in
outreach efforts to educate the public. Before the show aired, Christine Brown gave an
interview to HBO in 2007, appeared in the TV show 48 Hours in 2008, and spoke at the
University of Utah about polygamy and her practices in 2009. Brown, 850 F. Supp. 2d at
1244.
13
Steve Baron, TLC’s ‘Sister Wives’ Season 5 Finale Delivers 3.4 Million Viewers in
Live + 3 Ratings, TV BY THE NUMBERS, (Mar. 6, 2015, 3:28 PM), http://tvbythenumbers.zap
2it.com/2015/03/06/tlcs-sister-wives-season-5-finale-delivers-3-4-million-viewers-in-live3-ratings/ [https://perma.cc/VCC7-5H7F].
7
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The Browns are not alone in their public personae as “poly.” Since the airing
of their show, numerous other shows exploring the lifestyles of plural relationships
have emerged, including shows such as “Polyamory: Married & Dating” on
Showtime and “Polygamy USA” on National Geographic, which chronicle both
religious and secular poly relationships.14 The popularity of these TV shows both
contributes to and evidences an overall collective shift in acceptable relationship
norms that make up modern families today.15 Included under the broad umbrella of
“poly” are numerous multi-party adult relationship forms, such as polygamy (the
practice of having multiple spouses), polygyny (a husband with multiple wives),
polyandry (a wife with multiple husbands), and polyamory. 16 Polyamory
encompasses the widest range of relationship structures; a polyamorous relationship
can be composed of anything from two males and three females in a range of
hierarchies of relationships, to two lesbians and the biological father of their
children, who may have no sexual relationship with the two adult women. 17 In
conjunction with the rise of “intimacy pluralism,”18 characterizing poly relationships
as representative of modern tenets of liberalism based in choice and self-identity can
politically galvanize a practice previously characterized as insular, foreign, and
backward.19
The Harm. Scholars point out that identifying the harm, if any, caused by
polygamy is paramount in justifying its continued criminalization.20 The first step is
to identify the exact harm that would result if informal polygamy were allowed to
14

Polyamory: Married and Dating, SHOWTIME, http://www.sho.com/sho/polyamorymarried-and-dating/home [https://perma.cc/VJN3-BST2]; Polygamy USA, NATIONAL
GEOGRAPHIC
CHANNEL,
http://channel.nationalgeographic.com/polygamy-usa/
[https://perma.cc/8WR5-DHCY].
15
But cf. Aviram & Leachman, supra note 1, at 325 (warning that the “recent visibility
of multiparty marriage in the mainstream media provides one example of how public
exposure to multiparty relationships might reinforce stereotypes, even if the ostensible
intention is to normalize those relationships”).
16
Id. at 273–74, 297–99.
17
Id. at 298–99 (“Many polyamorous relationships consist of a ‘primary’ dyad, a
couple sharing a household, in which each partner also has ‘secondary’ and ‘tertiary’
relationships with outsiders to the household . . . . Other common structures are the
‘polyamorous vee,’ in which two people have romantic relationships with the same person,
but not with each other (though they may share a nonromantic sense of affection and
commitment); a triad or a quad, in which all three or four members are romantically involved
with each other; or an intimate network of friends, in which relationships are more fluid and
involve several people in different and ever-changing relationship structures.”).
18
For a discussion of “intimacy pluralism,” see Faucon, Polygamy After Windsor,
supra note 2, at 521, 525–28.
19
See generally Aviram & Leachman, supra note 1, at 306–08 (discussing background
principles of the gay liberationist and polyamorous communities).
20
See Maura I. Strassberg, Scrutinizing Polygamy: Utah’s Brown v. Buhman and
British Columbia’s Reference Re: Section 293, 64 EMORY L.J. 1815, 1819–20 (2015)
[hereinafter Strassberg, Scrutinizing Polygamy]; Turley, supra note 7, at 1910–11.
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flutter out into the world, decriminalized. Regardless of the constitutional test used
to measure the fit of any criminal bans of polygamy—whether it be strict,
heightened, or rational basis scrutiny under the Due Process, Equal Protection, or
Free Exercise clauses—the government in each instance would still have to prove
the apparent harms of polygamy to justify its restrictions.21
The debate around polygamy’s harms, what Professor Jonathan Turley calls
“The Loadstone Rock” of the polygamy question,22 has always been a fierce one.
But Judge Waddoups’ decision for the Utah Federal District Court brought a flurry
of scholarly responses in part because, procedurally and substantively, the decision
was so heavily shaped by the defense’s apparent “non-response” to the Brown
family’s seven detailed constitutional claims. 23 The defense introduced a mere
narrative with anecdotal stories in an attempt to prove the harms of polygamy.24 Had
the defense offered into evidence either personal testimony or empirical evidence of
polygamy’s harms, this would have presented to the district court some disputed
facts that could have prevented the granting of a summary judgment. Hindsight is,
of course, twenty-twenty, and while the litigation process in this instance failed to
produce a rigorous debate about the harms of polygamy, polygamy scholars since
the case frame both sides of the harm issue which can guide future litigation or
legislative action.25
One important theme to emerge from this litigation is the distinction exacted
between the harms of informal polygamy as they relate to both the private and public
aspects of the practice. The type of polygamy at stake in the Brown case touches the
private sphere in that it, by definition, involves persons cohabiting and otherwise
engaging in a marital-type relationship in a private, domestic setting. At this point
in the scholarly debate, most of the alleged harms attendant to the private aspects of
informal polygamy, such as statutory rape, spousal abuse, and sexual abuse, have
been largely discredited as mere ancillary effects of the secretive and insular nature
of polygamous communities led by despotic men, and not as direct results of
polygamy itself.26 The more poignant and relevant debate regarding the harms of
21

See Turley, supra note 7, at 1910–11.
Id. at 1910 (“[Harm] functions much like what Dickens called ‘The Loadstone Rock’
in A Tale of Two Cities—the rock upon which inevitably all cases must break.”).
23
Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1177 (D. Utah 2013) (stating that the
Browns were in the odd position of having to respond to defendants’ “non-response”);
Strassberg, Scrutinizing Polygamy, supra note 20, at 1819; see also Reference re: Section
293 of the Criminal Code of Canada, 2011 BCSC 1588, para. 2 (noting that “the case against
polygamy is all about harm”).
24
Brown, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1191.
25
See Strassberg, Scrutinizing Polygamy, supra note 20, at 1821–43; Turley, supra
note 7, at 1942–72.
26
See, e.g., JANET BENNION, WOMEN OF PRINCIPLE: FEMALE NETWORKING IN
CONTEMPORARY MORMON POLYGYNY 154 (1998) (noting that abuse in polygamous
societies is a result of individual personality types that would be abusive in monogamous
culture as well); Emily J. Duncan, The Positive Effects of Legalizing Polygamy: “Love Is a
22
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polygamy focus on the public aspects and the alleged social harms. Informal
polygamy touches upon the public sphere in that it often involves a public
“marriage” ceremony, after which the parties to the ceremony hold each other out as
husband and wife, despite not being legally married.27 In the case of the Browns, the
public conduct also involves their national TV show as well as their numerous
speaking engagements.28 As pointed out by the trial court, the State sees no harm in
clandestine or adulterous cohabitation when one of the cohabitants is already
married, yet somehow mandates criminal sanctions if the parties were to suddenly
make their conduct public and hold each other out as husband and wife.29
So what is the real harm here? Is simply calling someone a spouse in public
when legally he or she is not so harmful as to justify continuing to criminalize
polygamy? A felony conviction seems like a steep price to pay for engaging in this
type of rebellious, public behavior.30 Ironing out the harms of polygamy should be
the primary objective before any court could address whether the laws restricting
such conduct are either narrowly tailored or rationally related to achieving those
ends. Without more compelling arguments on the societal harms allegedly caused
by polygamy, I argue that informal polygamy, where the parties do not seek legal
recognition from the State for their polygamous relationship, should no longer be
outlawed.
The Law. After identifying the legitimate harms, if any, of informal polygamy,
the next inquiry focuses on the legal response to the supposed harm-inducing
conduct. Keeping in mind that the law can (and should) change over time to adapt
to the prevailing perceptions of acceptable and, more importantly unacceptable,
constraints on liberty,31 this next step explores the applicable constitutional law in
relation to its response to the alleged harms and its implications on individual
constitutional guarantees and protections.
Many Splendored Thing,” 15 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 315, 332 (2008) (noting that most
polygynists do not engage in many of the crimes or practices that have been associated with
polygynists). Another study concluded that these abuses are the result of “particularly
dysfunctional” polygynist families rather than problems inherent to polygamy. Maura
Strassberg, The Crime of Polygamy, 12 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 353, 398 (2003).
27
See Brief of the Cato Inst., supra note 7, at 9–14.
28
See Robert E. Rains, The Future of Justice Scalia’s Predictions of Family Law
Doom, 29 BYU J. PUB. L. 353, 364 (2015).
29
Brown, 947 F. Supp. at 1212–15.
30
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-101 (West 2010), invalidated by Brown v. Herbert, 43 F.
Supp. 3d 1229 (D. Utah 2014).
31
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2013) (“Had those who drew and
ratified the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment
known the components of liberty in its manifold possibilities, they might have been more
specific. They did not presume to have this insight. They knew times can blind us to certain
truths and later generations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve
only to oppress. As the Constitution endures, persons in every generation can invoke its
principles in their own search for greater freedom.”).
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The law inquiry has two subparts: (1) the legal arguments at stake that control
the polygamy question, and (2) the legal verbiage needed to particularly define the
line—if any—between acceptable behavior and outlawed behavior in the context of
polygamy. One inquiry focuses on the actual law; the other focuses on the language
of the law. The primary step in the law inquiry is to establish which constitutional
protections and arguments can and should frame the legal debate. The next inquiry
is then how to word the language of the prohibited conduct so as to ensure the public
knows what conduct is condemned and which is allowed.
Most arguments attacking the constitutionality of anti-bigamy criminal statutes
use some form of a combination of Free Exercise jurisprudence under the 1st
Amendment and substantive Due Process jurisprudence under the 14th
Amendment.32 Some occasionally add an Equal Protection claim, while others may
add a “hybrid” rights claim under the Wisconsin v. Yoder 33 analysis in the Free
Exercise arena.34 In the Brown litigation alone, the district court used Free Exercise,
substantive Due Process and Equal Protection, as well as the hybrid analysis in order
to support the opinion.35 The points of contention in both the Free Exercise and the
substantive Due Process arguments focus on the level of scrutiny to apply to the
criminal laws under both schools. With so many constitutional protections
potentially implicated, the need to focus on which constitutional protections and why
is necessary to quiet the dissonant din.
The law inquiry also focuses on how to write the language of the law, which
stems from the sporadic, divergent, and legal gerrymandering adopted by law
enforcement and courts over the years to interpret and apply the anti-polygamy

32

See, e.g., James Askew, The Slippery Slope: The Vitality of Reynolds v. US After
Romer and Lawrence, 12 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 627, 627–28 (2006) (discussing “the
legal definition of marriage” in the context of “American marriage jurisprudence”); Todd M.
Gillett, The Absolution of Reynolds: The Constitutionality of Religious Polygamy, 8 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 497, 497–501 (2000) (analyzing the history of polygamy in the United
States and arguing that polygamy should be legal); Ronald C. Den Otter, Three May Not Be
a Crowd: The Case for a Constitutional Right to Plural Marriage, 64 EMORY L.J. 1977, 1977
(2015) (considering constitutional arguments that support the legality of plural marriage);
Cassiah M. Ward, I Now Pronounce You Husband and Wives: Lawrence v. Texas and the
Practice of Polygamy in Modern America, 11 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 131, 132 (2004)
(analyzing Lawrence v. Texas and arguing that plural marriage should not be legal under due
process principles); Michael G. Myers, Comment, Polygamist Eye for the Monogamist Guy:
Homosexual Sodomy . . . Gay Marriage . . . Is Polygamy Next?, 42 HOUSTON L. REV. 1451,
1456–57 (2006) (analyzing Lawrence v. Texas and arguing that plural marriage should be
legal if same-sex marriage is legal).
33
406 U.S. 205 (1972).
34
In Yoder, the Supreme Court articulated a theory later termed “hybrid rights” in
which a free exercise of religion claim coupled with another constitutionally protected claim
pushed the potentially infringing statute into the category of strict scrutiny review. Id. at 234–
36.
35
Brown, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1217–18, 1221–25.
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criminal statutes.36 One of the main substantive issues in the Brown case comes from
the district court’s rightful inability to square the conduct that the State says it wants
to outlaw against the vague “cohabitation” language actually used in the statute. The
statute in question reads: “A person is guilty of bigamy when, knowing he has a
husband or wife or knowing the other person has a husband or wife, the person
purports to marry another person or cohabits with another person.”37 The district
court found the cohabitation prong to be impermissibly vague, as a married person
who merely cohabits with another person is guilty of bigamy, and struck it from the
statute. 38 The district court then turned to the “purports to marry” prong and
determined that it refers to attempts at legal, not informal, polygamous marriages.39
After the decision, essentially only marriage license fraud is illegal under the
statute—unlikely the intent of the legislature.40
The Policy. With so many potential constitutional protections implicated, it
becomes increasingly more imperative that some guiding principle or overarching
aim should inform which route to take. The policy question looks to both the current
clime and into the future to determine which guiding principle it should be.
Considering the procedural point of the Brown case in particular, where the district
court already struck down the cohabitation prong of the polygamy statute using Free
Exercise jurisprudence, the arguments based upon religion are inescapable.
Framing the polygamy issue as primarily a religious one, however, is
problematic in the long-term. Among many reasons, a victory secured on its grounds
would be a short-lived celebration followed by calls for religious exceptionalism and
equal protection violations for secular polys or those who adhere to no religious
agenda in their poly lifestyles.41 The hope is that future litigants and courts will heed
earlier pleas to turn away from arguments based in religion and instead focus on
defining the fundamental rights attendant to the practice of polygamy under
36

See generally Strassberg, Scrutinizing Polygamy, supra note 20, at 1850 (critiquing
the Utah District Court’s finding that the anti-polygamy statute is “a ‘religious
gerrymander’” requiring strict scrutiny (citing Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.
City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 535 (1993)).
37
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-101 (West 2010) (emphasis added), invalidated by Brown
v. Herbert, 43 F. Supp. 3d 1229 (D. Utah 2014).
38
Brown, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1225–26.
39
Id. at 1226–28.
40
Id.; Strassberg, Scrutinizing Polygamy, supra note 20, at 1845–46.
41
Faucon, Polygamy After Windsor, supra note 2, at 522–26. While continuing to
frame the issue as a religious one would implicate the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA), which requires a strict scrutiny standard of review, the RFRA is still bound by the
limits of the Constitution, specifically, the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause.
Because accommodation laws cannot improperly privilege religion over non-religion,
securing exemptions or privileges based on religion would “relieve believers of constraints
from which many nonbelievers might also prefer to be free.” Gregory P. Magarian, How to
Apply the RFRA to Federal Law Without Violating the Constitution, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1903,
1977 (2001).
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substantive Due Process. 42 This approach would protect plural marriages and
relationships based on modern liberalist ideals of personal identity and intimacy
pluralism, as traditional polygamy is just one iteration of a multi-party consensual
relationship based on autonomy and choice.43
Focusing on this overriding policy, this Article argues that criminal laws against
informal polygamy are unconstitutional based on tenets of substantive Due Process
and Free Speech. 44 While scholars have considered both bodies of law in
formulating arguments in favor of polygamy, none have yet to combine the two
doctrines in a way that applies substantive Due Process guarantees to the private
aspects of polygamy (living together as a married couple, sharing an intimate
relationship, and raising children) and applies Free Speech guarantees to the public
aspects of polygamy (engaging in a public “marriage” ceremony and holding each
other out as spouses in public). To solidify the contours of this policy and legal
approach, this Article offers an idealized, mock opinion in the Brown litigation that
decides the constitutionality question based on substantive Due Process and Free
Speech.
Part II of this Article reviews the Utah district court’s decision in Brown v.
Buhman and the flurry of reactionary scholarship critiquing the reasoning and
ultimate conclusions. Looking through the lens of potential evils, this section
analyzes the arguments based on harm to the individual and then provides a more
in-depth analysis of the potential harms to society.
Part III of the Article transitions into the current status of the case and focuses
on the substantive arguments at stake on appeal and the different approaches that
both the litigants and amici curiae took toward arguing their positions. Next, the
Article discusses the Tenth Circuit’s decision to dispose of the case on procedural
grounds and offers different avenues the court could have taken to draw the confines
of the law around the prohibited behavior.
Part IV of the Article provides an idealized, mock Tenth Circuit opinion—
reflective of how I hope an appeals court would address the decriminalization
question in a model case. Part IV also briefly provides ideas for model criminal
legislation. This section then concludes with an argument that the next
decriminalization challenge should approach the case using substantive Due Process
and Free Speech, exploring the potential legal tenets that could ultimately emerge
from this case and what it could mean in shaping our modern iterations on acceptable
forms of consenting adult relationships.

42

Faucon, Polygamy After Windsor, supra note 2, at 522–26.
See Aviram & Leachman, supra note 1, at 297. “Traditional polygamy” is used in
this context to refer to “polygyny” (a husband with multiple wives).
44
See infra Part IV.
43
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II. THE HARM
Conceptions of inherent harm are not always intuitive. 45 In the context of
polygamy, capturing and defining the exact harms caused by polygamous behavior,
while proving somewhat elusive, remains paramount in justifying its continued
criminalization.46 When measured against constitutional protections, regardless of
the scrutiny level or “fit” test used, the government must still identify and support a
public concern. 47 The Brown litigation highlights the continued importance of
identifying polygamy’s harms in two ways. The failure of the litigation to produce
a robust evidentiary and legal debate on polygamy’s harms caused a lopsided
constitutional analysis which almost compelled the district court’s ruling.48 Another
influential concept that results from overlaying the harm glossed over in the Brown
litigation is the emergence of the distinction between the public and private aspects
of polygamy. Zeroing in on the public and private aspects can more explicitly outline
specific harms as they relate to either private or public behavior.
First, this section discusses the circumstances leading up to the initial filing of
the suit by the Brown family in Brown v. Buhman and briefly discusses some
preliminary procedural motions about standing and mootness, as well as evidentiary
weaknesses on the part of litigators. Second, this section then discusses the district
court’s holding and its effect on the law, specifically its failure to address the allimportant question of harm. Third, this section analyzes the different arguments used
regarding the potential harm, or evil, allegedly at the heart of polygamy that justifies
its criminalization. Finally, the section ends with an attempt to box in the specific
social evil allegedly caused by informal polygamy and determine whether or not
such a social harm can justify polygamy’s continued prohibition.
A. The District Court Decision
The overall tenor of the events leading up to the district court’s decision reflects
the need for more clarity, as the constant threat and sporadic enforcement of
polygamy laws leave both law enforcement and poly families in a tenuous position.49
Before the “Sister Wives” reality show aired, Utah government officials knew that
45

See Cheryl Hanna, Rethinking Consent in a Big Love Way, 17 MICH. J. GENDER &
L. 111, 129–35 (2010).
46
See Strassberg, Scrutinizing Polygamy, supra note 20, at 1820; Turley, supra note 7,
at 1910 (“In case after case, courts return to the question of harm: harm in interracial
marriage, harm in same sex marriage, harm in plural marriage.”).
47
Debate exists over whether polygamy bans are subject to strict or heightened scrutiny
as opposed to rational basis scrutiny under the Free Exercise, substantive Due Process, and
Equal Protection doctrines. See Strassberg, Scrutinizing Polygamy, supra note 20, at 1843.
But see Turley, supra note 7, at 1910–11.
48
See Turley, supra note 7, at 1910–11.
49
See Ashley E. Morin, Use It or Lose It: The Enforcement of Polygamy Laws in
America, 66 RUTGERS L. REV. 497, 518 (2014).
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the Brown family was poly.50 State officials acknowledged that the show prompted
them to open an investigation, stating that the Browns were “committing crimes
every night on television,” which made their prosecution easier.51 The State failed
to uncover evidence of any other crime. The investigation was eventually dropped,
but Utah County Attorney Jeffrey R. Buhman stated that the Browns could still be
prosecuted for polygamy in the future and that the Browns’ move to Nevada would
not that.52
The Browns filed suit in Utah Federal District Court on July 13, 2011 against
Defendants Buhman, Gary Herbert in his capacity as governor of Utah, and Mark
Shurtleff in his capacity as Utah attorney general.53 Of the many pretrial motions
filed, the defendants brought a motion to dismiss based on lack of standing.54 The
court denied the motion, but it did dismiss two of the defendants, leaving only
Buhman, as he made the public comments about the Brown family.55 The Browns
then filed a motion for summary judgment, setting forth seven detailed constitutional
claims, including “due process, equal protection, free speech, free association, free
exercise, the Establishment Clause, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”56 In response, Buhman
filed a motion to dismiss based on mootness, as well as a cross motion for summary
judgment.57 When Buhman lost the mootness challenge, he then filed his response
to the Browns’ original motion for summary judgment.58
At this point, it is unclear why, when the merits of the case were finally before
the court, that the government should fail to mount a vigorous defense. As noted by
both the trial court and numerous scholarly responses to the decision, the “sheer lack
of response” by the defense to the plaintiff’s “seven detailed constitutional claims”
was shocking.59 The district court noted his astonishment during trial and explicitly
asked the defense before closing of evidence whether it wanted to introduce more
evidence or argument on the issue of harm.60 The defense declined. As evidence of
polygamy’s harms, the defense introduced mere anecdotal references and stories of
alleged harm, without any expert or testimonial evidence.61 This failure on the part
of the defense is evident, but the deeper question is why.62 Regardless of the cause,
50

Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1178–79 (D. Utah 2013), vacated as moot
by 822 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2016).
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id. at 1176.
54
Brown v. Herbert, 850 F. Supp. 2d 1240, 1243 (D. Utah 2012).
55
Id. at 1244.
56
Brown, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1176.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id. at 1176–77.
60
Id. at 1177, 1191, 1216.
61
Id. at 1177.
62
It could have just been mere exhaustion after having lost, what I think, were
meretricious and debatable jurisdictional objections. It could have been a failure on the part
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the effect of this omission essentially compelled the ultimate decision from the
district court, which accepted the Browns’ factual allegations largely uncontested.
After the hearing on plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, the district court
issued a ninety-one page opinion granting plaintiffs’ motion, which struck down the
cohabitation prong of the Utah anti-polygamy statute as being unconstitutional.63 In
the opinion, the court engaged in what I see as three exercises—statutory
interpretation, scrutiny level constitutional analysis, and statutory reinterpretation to
save the statute.
1. Statutory Interpretation
The Utah statute at issue reads: “A person is guilty of bigamy when, knowing
he has a husband or wife or knowing the other person has a husband or wife, the
person purports to marry another person or cohabits with another person.” 64 In
interpreting this statute, the court read the “purports to marry prong” and the
“cohabitation” prong as separate and tried to identify the prohibited conduct in each.
In interpreting the “purports to marry” prong, the court was not persuaded by the
definition used by the majority in State v. Holm, 65 a 2006 Utah Supreme Court
polygamy case, which found that “purports to marry” is not limited to attempts at
multiple legal marriages.66 According to the Holm majority, “purports to marry” also
includes instances in which a couple does not seek legal recognition but may conduct
a religious ceremony and otherwise hold themselves out as married.67 The district
court in Brown instead followed the dissenting opinion in Holm, which limited the
“purports to marry” prong to only those seeking multiple legal marriage licenses.68
The district court then found that the “purports to marry” prong did not apply to the
Browns because Kody Brown only had one legal license at the time to Meri.69
The court then read the statute again with the “purports to marry” prong
removed: “A person is guilty of bigamy when, knowing he has a husband or wife or
knowing the other person has a husband or wife, the person . . . cohabits with another

of the defense, among the sea of pretrial and cross motions and memoranda, to see the
importance of this particular summary judgment. The omission could also arise out of a sort
of self-assuredness, resting on historical and societal negative attitudes toward polygamy and
a failure to foresee a scenario in which the plaintiffs could possibly prevail.
63
Brown, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1176.
64
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-101 (West 2010), invalidated by Brown v. Herbert, 43 F.
Supp. 3d 1229 (D. Utah 2014).
65
137 P.3d 726 (Utah 2006).
66
Brown, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1191–92 (citing State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726, 737 (Utah
2006)).
67
Holm, 137 P.3d at 731.
68
Brown, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1205–06, 1217–18 (citing Holm, 137 P.3d at 765, 771
(Durham, C.J., dissenting)).
69
Id. at 1178, 1210.
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person.” 70 The court found that this second, cohabitation prong applied to the
Browns by way of their “religious cohabitation,” in which a person, usually the
husband, participates in a religious “marriage” ceremony with a “spiritual” wife and
after which the couple cohabits or lives together as a family. 71 The court then
considered whether plaintiffs’ challenges to the cohabitation prong had merit.
2. Scrutiny Level Constitutional Analysis
This lead the district court into its main constitutional analysis. I have
previously detailed the court’s constitutional bases for striking the cohabitation
prong from the statute in previous works, so I will not repeat the entirety of that
explanation here.72 Ultimately, the district court held that under either strict scrutiny
or rational basis scrutiny under the Free Exercise clause, the cohabitation prong
would not pass constitutional muster. 73 Looking to the standard established in
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,74 the court found that
strict scrutiny applied to the Browns’ Free Exercise claim because of the historical
persecution of religious polygamists in particular.75 The court also found that the
Free Exercise claim was subject to strict scrutiny under the hybrid rights analysis in
Wisconsin v. Yoder,76 in which the Supreme Court held that laws restricting practices
rooted in Free Exercise of Religion in conjunction with another fundamental right
receive strict scrutiny.77
The prohibition in the Utah statute, the court held, could not pass strict scrutiny
because it was not narrowly tailored to promote a compelling government interest.78
It is at this point that the court returned to its previous exercise of statutory
interpretation. When deciding whether the statute was narrowly tailored, the court
read the terms of the “cohabitation” prong literally: “or cohabits with another
person.” In other words, a person is guilty of bigamy if they are married and simply
cohabit with another person.79 The court detailed how the language of the statute
applies equally to both polygamous cohabitants or to adulterous cohabitants and

70

Id. at 1226–28.
Id. at 1181.
72
See Faucon, Polygamy After Windsor, supra note 2, at 503–10.
73
Brown, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1178.
74
508 U.S. 520 (1993).
75
In Hialeah, the Supreme Court held that a statute that is neutral and generally
applicable on its face is subject to rational basis scrutiny unless the statute is discriminatory
as applied. Id. at 531–32. In the instance of “religious polygamy,” the Utah district court
found that the anti-bigamy statute was historically used to target religious polygamists, so
strict scrutiny should apply. Brown, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1197–1202.
76
406 U.S. 205 (1972).
77
Id. at 234–36.
78
Brown, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1221–22.
79
Id. at 1215.
71
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those with mistresses, which are not considered crimes. 80 By pointing out the
vagueness in the statute, the court effectively held that the statute failed strict
scrutiny and also held that, even if rational basis review applies to the Free Exercise
claim, the statute was not rationally related to promoting whatever the alleged
government concern was.81
As to the Browns’ Due Process and Equal Protection claims, the court declined
to apply heightened scrutiny based on the fundamental right to intimate relationships
within a private home, as established in Lawrence v. Texas. 82 The infamous
Lawrence case struck down Texas’s criminal law against sodomy as
unconstitutional, decriminalizing homosexual sexual conduct within the home. 83
Applying that protection to the conduct of the Browns, in which they have never
claimed to be legally married but live their lives as married couples do within the
privacy of their homes, the district court found that it was bound by previous
interpretations of Lawrence.84 Covering its bases, the district court held that even if
private polygamous conduct is not a fundamental right, the statute would still fail
under rational basis review, again returning to the vagueness argument in the context
of polygamous cohabitation versus adulterous cohabitation.85
3. Statutory Reinterpretation to Save the Statute’s Constitutionality
Because of the failure of the cohabitation prong’s fit, the court attempted to
then “save” the statute by excising the “bad” parts. 86 The court struck the
cohabitation prong from the statute altogether. What remained was, “A person is
guilty of bigamy when, knowing he has a husband or wife or knowing the other
person has a husband or wife, the person purports to marry another person.”87 Left
intact was the State’s ability to prosecute those who, knowing they are married,
“purport to marry” another person. Under Judge Waddoups’ interpretation, “purport
to marry” only means anyone who tries to commit marriage license fraud or tries to
get multiple marriage licenses.88 By this new interpretation of the criminal statute,
the only harm that Judge Waddoups saw worthy of outlaw was a public attempt at
obtaining more than one legal marriage at a time. By restricting the crime to marriage
license fraud, the district court decriminalized informal polygamy in Utah.

80

Id. at 1213–15.
Id. at 1222–23.
82
539 U.S. 558, 584–85 (2003).
83
Id. at 567.
84
Brown, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1202.
85
Id. at 1222–25.
86
Id. at 1227, 30–31.
87
See id.
88
Id. at 1233–34.
81
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B. The Public and Private Spheres at Play in Polygamy’s Harms
When the Utah district court announced its decision on December 13, 2013, the
media and public reactions were swift and varied, ranging from praise and elation to
derision and dismay.89 Academics tracking the case produced a flood of analytical
scholarship in response to or inspired by events at stake in the case.90 The main
issues with the Brown case in the critical scholarship address all three aspects of the
court’s process—the statutory interpretation, the constitutional analysis, and the
statutory reinterpretation to save the statute. The case also became a catalyst for
larger theoretical discussions about the current clime of family law in an age of
expanding rights,91 the alleged harms of polygamy on individuals and on society as
a whole,92 and the need to elevate monogamy in Western society over the liberty
interest inherent in choosing family composition and intimate relationships.93 Some
even used the Brown case, in conjunction with other Supreme Court marriage
equality cases, to springboard arguments supporting a constitutional right to the
recognition of multiple legal marriages.94
89

See, e.g., Sarah Pulliam Bailey, Utah Polygamy Court Ruling on ‘Sister Wives’ Case
Confirms Fears of Social Conservatives, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 17, 2013, 8:28 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/12/17/utah-polygamy-court-ruling_n_4455706.html
[https://perma.cc/3FK3-4ERP]; Bill Mears, Judge Strikes Down Part of Utah Polygamy Law
in ‘Sister Wives’ Case, CNN (Dec. 16, 2013, 11:03 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/12/14/
justice/utah-polygamy-law/index.html [https://perma.cc/UY2X-2GDP]; John Schwartz, A
Utah Law Prohibiting Polygamy Is Weakened, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/15/us/a-utah-law-prohibiting-polygamy-is-weakened.
html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/7TLW-XV6S].
90
See, e.g., Julia Chamberlin & Amos N. Guiora, Polygamy: Not “Big Love” but
Significant Harm, 35 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 144, 148 (2014); Hope Marie Deutsch,
Marrying Polygamy into Title VII, 16 RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION 145, 175 (2014); Melissa
Murray, Accommodating Nonmarriage, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 661, 666 (2015); Rains, supra
note 28, at 353; Strassberg, Scrutinizing Polygamy, supra note 20, at 1819–20; Turley, supra
note 7, at 1907–08; Kelly O. White, The Sister Wives: Has Incest and Sexual Assault Become
the New Reality? The United States District Court for the District of Utah Grants
Polygamists the Holy Grail, 48 CREIGHTON L. REV. 681, 683 (2015).
91
See, e.g., Murray, supra note 90, at 685, 692.
92
See, e.g., Strassberg, Scrutinizing Polygamy, supra note 20, at 1821–42.
93
See, e.g., John Witte, Jr., The Nature of Family, the Family of Nature: The Surprising
Liberal Defense of the Traditional Family in the Enlightenment, 63 EMORY L.J. 591, 671
(2015) [hereinafter Witte, Enlightenment] (“The heart of the argument is that exclusive and
enduring monogamous marriages are the best way to ensure paternal certainty and essential
joint parental investment in fragile and dependent children.”).
94
See, e.g., Aviram & Leachman, supra note 1, at 308 n.253, 327; Faucon, Polygamy
After Windsor, supra note 2, at 515–22; Elizabeth Oklevitch & Lynne Marie Kohm,
Federalism or Extreme Makeover of State Domestic Regulations Power? The Rules and the
Rhetoric of Windsor (and Perry), 6 ELON L. REV. 337, 367 (2014); Otter, supra note 32, at
2012–14.
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The district court’s decision provided a thorough analysis to support its choice
of scrutiny level for each of the Browns’ constitutional claims, as well as the
vagueness problems with the statute as written. What is hidden within the opinion is
a discussion of the potential harms of polygamy that could justify restricting and
criminalizing the practice, which is what the district court should have focused on,
regardless of the scrutiny level used. The defense provided academic discussion of
the “social harms” of polygamy, but introduced no admissible evidence of that
factual assertion. Indeed, since the Brown decision, scholars stress that the showing
or dispelling of alleged harm is the key to the decriminalization question.95 If the
poly movement is going to track the political and judicial trajectory of the gay rights
movement, mirroring the progress of the Lawrence—Windsor—Obergefell line,96
then the first step for poly supporters is to decriminalize polygamy. The fiercely
debated scholarly discussions on harm post-Brown can provide guidance on this
issue in order to help shape the direction of future decriminalization litigation.
Professor Maura Strassberg’s approach to framing the harms of polygamy
practically gives future poly opponents a line up of judicial arguments and
supporting evidence that they could use to litigate the issue of harm.97 She compared
the showings of harm in the Brown case with another recent decision by the British
Columbia Supreme Court upholding polygamy criminalization, Reference Re:
Section 293, in which opponents of polygamy provided extensive evidence of the
alleged harms of polygamy through expert and personal testimony. 98 She then
chronicled the harms identified in different state and federal polygamy cases and
discussed each of the harms identified in Reference Re: Section 293. 99 We can
generally group these alleged harms into harms to individuals, such as the
sensationalized abuses to women and children, and harms to society.
Some scholars focus more theoretically on polygamy’s potential harms to
society in that polygamy disrupts social, legal, normative, and traditional institutions

95

See Strassberg, Scrutinizing Polygamy, supra note 20, at 1823.
The progression of the Lawrence-Windsor-Obergefell line in the context of
homosexual rights begins first with Lawrence, which decriminalized homosexual sexual
conduct within the home. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 563 (2003). The Windsor case
next found, on a federal level, that the failure to recognize same-sex couples as married for
purposes of federal legislation is unconstitutional. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675,
2696 (2013). Finally, the Obergefell opinion applied that rational to state prohibitions on
same-sex marriage. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015).
97
Strassberg, Scrutinizing Polygamy, supra note 20, at 1821–42.
98
Strassberg, Scrutinizing Polygamy, supra note 20, at 1818–19. The trial in Reference
re: Section 293 of the Criminal Code of Canada under Canadian law involved forty-two days
of hearings, ninety affidavits and expert reports, and “Brandeis Brief
materials . . . . compris[ing] several hundred legal and social science articles, books, and
DVDs.” Id. at 1818 (alteration in original) (citing Reference re: Section 293 of the Criminal
Code of Canada, 2011 BCSC 1588, paras. 15–16).
99
Strassberg, Scrutinizing Polygamy, supra note 20, at 1821, 1824.
96
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based on monogamous marriage.100 John Witte, Jr.’s recent work, The Western Case
for Monogamy Over Polygamy, argues against the acceptance of polygamy in the
West. He claims that monogamy is based on historical policies meant to create a
domestic sphere in which two equal partners are complementary and equivalent to
the other, thus creating stability in the home and mutual support as two people age
and change over time.101 These monogamous ideals, as well as the historical derision
against polygamy’s harms, such as its being a “threat to good citizenship, social
order, and political stability, even an impediment to the advancement of civilizations
toward liberty, equality, and democratic government,” 102 continue to influence
discussions about the overall harm to society caused by polygamy.
Professor Turley’s stance on the issue of harm takes a step back from the
detailed enumeration of harms and instead approaches the question by asking what
type of harm needs deterrence based on two theoretical conceptions of harm.103 The
first, which he discredits in the polygamy arena, is “compulsive liberalism,” which
“seeks limitations on speech and consensual conduct to combat sexism and other
social ills.”104 The “compulsive liberalism” model, as applied to polygamy, would
impermissibly restrain individual choice and liberty for the supported protection and
advancement of women and ordered society.105 The second model of harm, based
100

See, e.g., Hema Chatlani, In Defense of Marriage: Why Same-Sex Marriage Will
Not Lead Us Down a Slippery Slope Toward the Legalization of Polygamy, 6 APPALACHIAN
J.L. 101, 128–32 (2006); Maura I. Strassberg, Distinctions of Form or Substance:
Monogamy, Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1501, 1509–11 (1997)
[hereinafter Strassberg, Distinctions]; Witte, Enlightenment, supra note 93, at 591, 599, 620,
631, 641, & 651.
101
JOHN WITTE, JR., THE WESTERN CASE FOR MONOGAMY OVER POLYGAMY 36
(2015).
102
Witte, Western Case, supra note 4, at 1678; see also Martha M. Ertman, Race
Treason: The Untold Story of America’s Ban on Polygamy, 19 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 287,
306–31 (2010) (discussing the Mormon practice of polygamy as a form of race treason). In
the late 1800s, political cartoons depict Mormon polygamists as “barbaric” and “primitive,”
often pictured with “others”—Chinese immigrants, Native-Americans, African-Americans,
and Irish immigrants—as “troublesome.” Id. at 308. Congressional Republicans compared
Mormon polygamy to Chinese, Muslim, and South Asian despotic cultural practices, like
concubinage, coolieism, and prostitution. Id. at 312–13. According to these
characterizations, “civilization rose ‘like the sun in the farthest reaches of the East and
advanced progressively westward,’ leaving behind China, India, and the Arab world as
cultures ‘past their glory.’” Id. at 313 (quoting JOHN KUO WEI TCHEN, NEW YORK BEFORE
CHINATOWN: ORIENTALISM AND THE SHAPING OF AMERICAN CULTURE 1776–1882, at xvi
(1999)).
103
Turley, supra note 7, at 1929–30.
104
Id. at 1905.
105
Id. at 1933 (“[F]eminist scholars have embraced arguments based on majoritarian
morality or values to seek to criminalize some forms of consensual conduct. These ‘bad
choices’ are consensual but still harmful in the view of these scholars. This trend in some
scholarship, and legislative measures, can be called ‘compulsive liberalism’—an effort to
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on John Stuart Mill’s theory of societal harm and regulation, requires a more
concrete form of injury to an individual to justify government restrictions on
individual choice.106 Turley pushes the second model of harm, and, in the context of
polygamy, uses both tried and true as well as new arguments to discount the alleged
harms caused to individuals by the practice of polygamy.107
In approaching my framework for discussing the harms of polygamy, my first
goal is to view harms in both a theoretical and concrete fashion. In reviewing the
converse side of that equation, I think that harms to both individuals and harms to
society belong within the purview of justifications for the use of criminal laws. The
crux of this section is not to recount arguments for and against the veracity of each
of the individual harms, as I think sound scholarship already discredits many of the
alleged individual harms. 108 This section approaches the individual harms by
grouping them by their counterarguments instead in order to distill which harms, if
any, remain relevant for discussion. The section then discusses in more detail the
alleged harms to society, which will provide a more enumerated-style of
counterargument. In particular, I address the “cruel arithmetic of polygamy”109 and
the need to maintain “ordered liberty” and our system of laws based on monogamy.
1. Harms Caused by Criminalization, Isolation, and Misogynist Beliefs
This subsection addresses a mixture of both harms to individuals and harms to
society that are allegedly caused by polygamy. I posit, instead, that these outcomes
are not caused by polygamy itself but can be ancillary effects of polygamy when
practiced within an isolated society, removed from governmental oversight or
mainstream societal influence. These harms include crimes such as child
marriage, 110 statutory rape, 111 incest, 112 spousal and child abuse, 113 and lack of
compel the correct choices or conduct in society.”). Turley further indicates that Professor
Harcourt referred to this trend as “conservative liberalism” to capture the same ironic shift
in legal theory. Id. at 1933–34 n.122 (citing Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm
Principle, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 109, 116 (1999)).
106
Id. at 1932–33 (quoting JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 23 (Boston, Ticknor &
Fields 1863) (1859)) (stating that “the only purpose for which power can be rightfully
exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to
others”).
107
Id. at 1942–72.
108
See infra Section II.B.1.
109
See CRAIG JONES, A CRUEL ARITHMETIC: INSIDE THE CASE AGAINST POLYGAMY 1–
5 (2012).
110
See DAPHNE BRAMHAM, THE SECRET LIVES OF SAINTS: CHILD BRIDES AND LOST
BOYS IN CANADA’S POLYGAMOUS MORMON SECT 2, 5–6 (2008).
111
See Chamberlin & Guiora, supra note 90, at 178.
112
See White, supra note 90, at 681.
113
See BRAMHAM, supra note 110, at 5–6; Chamberlin & Guiora, supra note 90, at
182–85 (discussing polygamy’s “lost boys” as child endangerment and abandonment in the
name of religious extremism).
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education and healthcare,114 as well as society’s alleged overall need to maintain and
control despotic groups from flourishing and perpetuating abuse. 115 As to the
individuals harms listed, such as child marriage and spousal abuse—they are already
outlawed. Criminal laws are specifically tailored to, and already do, address these
particular crimes.116 In fact, in the context of polygamy, law enforcement seldom
prosecutes practicing polygamists unless one of these other heinous abuses is
present. 117 But polygamy itself remains a crime. The lack of enforcement for
polygamy alone, absent these other abuses, seems itself evidence that polygamy
does not inherently cause these harms.118
As many have pointed out, these alleged individual harms are not caused by
polygamy, much like they are not caused by monogamy. Monogamous marriages
are not free from crimes such as spousal abuse, incest, and child sexual abuse, but
monogamous marriages remain legal despite the long and historical presence of
misogynist laws and unthinkable abuses committed against women and children in
monogamous relationships.119 While polygamy became defined by these ancillary
abuses, monogamy somehow escaped these broad characterizations. This broad
characterization that polygamy is abusive continues to haunt otherwise law-abiding
polygamists today. 120 Even in the Brown litigation, the parties felt the need to
114

See Chamberlin & Guiora, supra note 90, at 166 (noting that Warren Jeffs, the nowincarcerated leader of the FLDS Church, told his members to remove their children from
public schools and provided instead recorded lectures by Jeffs regarding religion and his
view of the world, rather than topics such as math, English, and science).
115
See United States v. Reynolds, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878) (noting that polygamy
causes despotic groups).
116
See Turley, supra note 7, at 1919–20.
117
Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1178–79 (D. Utah 2013).
118
On oral argument, Judge Moritz asked counsel for defendant Buhman how the state
can argue that the law is rational considering its lack of enforcement. Oral Argument at
20:56, Brown v. Buhman, 822 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2016) (No. 14-4117) (on file with
author); see also Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 911 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(“The State cannot plausibly assert that unbending application of a criminal prohibition is
essential to fulfill any compelling interest, if it does not, in fact, attempt to enforce that
prohibition.”); Treasury Emp’t. v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 687 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (stating that a government interested in symbolism, “even symbolism for so
worthy a cause as the abolition of unlawful drugs,” cannot suffice to abrogate the
constitutional rights of individuals.).
119
See Turley, supra note 7, at 1950–51.
120
One FBI agent who dealt with polygamous communities said, “At least 99% of all
polygamists are peaceful, law-abiding people, no threat to anybody. It’s unfortunate that
they’re stigmatized by a band of renegades.” Bella Stumbo, No Tidy Stereotype:
Polygamists: Tale of Two Families, L.A. TIMES (May 13, 1988), http://articles.latimes.com/
1988-05-13/news/mn-3403_1_lebaron-family/3 [https://perma.cc/36K9-KLER]. Professor
Debra Majeed, who interviewed over 400 African-American Muslims and over a dozen in a
polygamous marriage, found no evidence of physical or sexual abuse of children within
polygamous marriages in that community. “If it does occur,” she states, “it is exceedingly
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stipulate that the Browns have never been accused of any other ancillary crime like
child or spousal abuse—would a monogamous defendant accused of criminal
adultery feel compelled to make such assertions?121 The distinction between harms
as they apply to monogamous marriage and as they apply to polygamous marriage
is a crucial one, as it can directly affect any rationality tests that might apply to
constitutional challenges to the distinction.122
I have also argued that the criminalization of the practice itself turns otherwise
law-abiding citizens into outlaws and misfits, pushing them into hidden, insular
groups.123 The isolation resulting from both the criminal and social stigmas against
polygamy is the very reason that these groups have the potential to perpetuate and
commit abuse—outside of the protective eye of the law, otherwise abusive men can
thrive in secretive and self-supporting environments.124 I would again argue that the
relationship between polygamous societies and potentially threatening groups is not
a direct one, but one in which polygamous groups are a mere example of a
potentially politically threatening group. Many forms of insular and politically
threatening groups exist that in no way advocate for polygamy in their political
platforms.125
One thought to take from this perspective is that polygamy should not be
defined by its extreme cases, as it is religious belief coupled with the isolationism
that can allow salacious and dangerous behaviors to grow unfettered. In a larger
work by Julia Chamberlin and Amos N. Guiora, they seek to show a link between
religious extremism in general and harm, using polygamy as an example. 126 An
additional aspect of Chamberlin and Guiora’s theory is that seclusion from the
outside world can even compound the dangers to the harmed children. I take issue
rare.” Inside African-American Muslim Polygamy at 3:32 NAT’L PUB. RADIO (July 23, 2008),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=92822369 [https://perma.cc/TZ29KGEX].
121
Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1179 (D. Utah 2013).
122
Abuse occurs in all types of relationships, monogamous ones included. See SUSAN
MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 135–38 (1989); Faucon, Marriage
Outlaws, supra note 1, at 4 (stating that “abuse is not absent from monogamous marriage,
nor does society define monogamous marriage by its instances of abuse”); Strassberg,
Distinctions, supra note 103, at 1578 (stating that “monogamous marriage in America has
been described as highly patriarchal, and nineteenth-century Mormon views on the proper
gender roles for women were not particularly unusual, or out-of-step with their non-Mormon
contemporaries”).
123
Faucon, Marriage Outlaws, supra note 1, at 11–14. Tim Dickson, a lawyer who
argued against anti-polygamy laws, “suggested that the high instance of teen pregnancy in
Bountiful, B.C., may be linked to religion and isolation rather than to polygamy per se.”
BENNION, POLYGAMY IN PRIMETIME, supra note 3.
124
See id. at 15–16.
125
See, e.g., Kirk Johnson, 25 Plead Not Guilty in Standoff at the Oregon Wildlife
Refuge, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/25/us/25-plead-notguilty-in-standoff-at-the-oregon-wildlife-refuge.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/5DL9-VD9F].
126
Chamberlin & Guiora, supra note 90, at 144–45.
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with the reasoning used by the authors to reach their conclusion in the context of
religious polygamy—Chamberlin and Guiora use an extreme example of an abusive
religious polygamous sect, the FLDS Church which is under the leadership of nowimprisoned Warren Jeffs, as a case study to prove their general tenet that polygamy
causes harm. 127 While I find the link between extremist religious beliefs and
subjugation of women a compelling generality, I decline to take a harder stance on
the merits of this argument as it relates to the practice of polygamy itself absent from
other environmental catalysts for abuse. I decry the use of religious exceptionalism
arguments in general in the context of decriminalization and potential recognition of
polygamy only to point out the pragmatic and theoretical shortcomings of using
religious freedom arguments, as I support, instead, arguments based on intimacy
pluralism and liberty ideals based on choice, identity, and speech.128
2. Harms to Society
If we can discredit most of the harms to individuals as direct results of
polygamy, then the alleged public and societal harms must hold the key. Otherwise,
informal polygamy cannot remain outlawed, and Judge Waddoups did not err in
setting it free. An examination of the societal harms generates a more theoretical
approach. In addressing the “harms to society,” Strassberg is keen to point out that
judicial opinions in the Tenth Circuit and the Utah Supreme Court fail to present a
cogent link between their findings that polygamy is bad for society and that
monogamy is generally important and the evidence of the effects of each societal
state. 129 As Strassberg points out, Potter states without further explanation that
“[m]onogamy is inextricably woven into the fabric of our society. It is the bedrock
upon which our culture is built.”130 But these opinions fail to explain how polygamy
is actually “harmful to ‘public life.’”131
She discredits arguments used in previous cases based on the desire to prevent
marriage fraud by stating that “fraud” does not exist in the context of religious
polygamists like the Browns, who have made no claim to multiple marriage licenses
(no fraud against the State) and who have made no claim of ignorance of the other
marriages (no fraud by Kody against any of the wives).132 She also highlights the
court’s inability in Holm to square the justification that polygamy laws prevent the
“misuse of government benefits,” as subsequent “wives” are not “and could not be
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See id. at 163–68.
Faucon, Polygamy After Windsor, supra note 2, at 478–79.
129
Strassberg, Scrutinizing Polygamy, supra note 20, at 1823–24 (discussing Potter v.
Murray City, 760 F.2d 1065 (10th Cir. 1985), State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726 (Utah 2006), and
State v. Green, 99 P.3d 820 (Utah 2004)).
130
Id. at 1823 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Potter
v. Murray City, 760 F.2d 1065, 1070 (10th Cir. 1985)).
131
Id. at 1824.
132
Id. at 1830.
128
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legally married to the father of their children,” and thus “no fraud is involved in
claiming benefits as unmarried.”133
After chronicling the failure of federal and state polygamy cases to particularly
justify both the alleged harms to individuals and harms to society, Strassberg turns
to the evidentiary showings of harm and the findings of the British Columbia
Supreme Court in Reference Re: Section 293, which came to the opposite result of
the Utah Federal District Court in Brown.134 In her recounting of the societal harms
identified in the Reference litigation, Strassberg begins by stating that “[a]ny
understanding of the harms arising from polygamy must begin with an appreciation
of the ‘cruel arithmetic of polygamy.’” 135 In responding to the listed harms to
society, this section first addresses and attempts to discredit the soundness of the
argument based on the “cruel arithmetic of polygamy” and show its logical flaws.
(a) Prevent the “Cruel Arithmetic of Polygamy”
The “cruel arithmetic of polygamy” is an analytical tool used to argue that the
practice of polygamy, or specifically polygyny, is inherently harmful to society.136
The title stems from a book by Craig Jones, entitled A Cruel Arithmetic. 137 The
general theory is that if some men are able to have more than one wife, other men,
likely low-status and undesirable ones, will be unable to find wives and will be
unable to produce a family.138 Strassberg supports Dr. Joseph Heinrich’s model of
the theory, as reproduced below:
Imagine a society of 40 adults, 20 males and 20 females . . . Suppose those
20 males vary from the unemployed high-school drop outs to CEOs, or
billionaires . . . Let’s assume that the twelve men with the highest status
marry 12 of the 20 women in monogamous marriages. Then, the top five
men (25% of the population) all take a second wife, and the top two (10%)
take a third wife. Finally, the top guy takes a fourth wife. This means that
of all marriages, 58% are monogamous. Only men in the to[p] 10% of
status or wealth married more than two women. The most wives anyone
has is four. The degree of polygynous marriage is not extreme in crosscultural perspective . . . but it creates a pool of unmarried men equal to
40% of the male population.139
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Id. at 1831.
Id. at 1834.
135
Id. at 1836 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
136
Id. For a definition of “polygyny,” see supra note 1 and accompanying text.
137
See JONES, supra note 109.
138
Strassberg, Scrutinizing Polygamy, supra note 20, at 1836.
139
Id. at 1836–37 (alteration in original) (quoting Reference re: Section 293 of the
Criminal Code of Canada, 2011 BCSC 1588, para. 505).
134
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Strassberg summarizes the full effect of this equation, as “polygyny causes the
proportion of young unmarried men [to unmarried women] to be high, up to a ratio
of 150 men to 100 women.”140 This “cruel arithmetic” then implicates the remaining
societal harm that I will address, which is the general idea that the state wants to
uphold social good by maintaining laws based on monogamy. The argument is that
the harms resulting from as-practiced polygyny justify criminalizing all forms of
poly marital-like relationships.141
The parameters of the theory is itself flawed—it uses a closed society of only
40 people in which only the males are poly and allowed to have more than one
spouse.142 While this example reflects some religious polygynous communities, it
certainly cannot apply to all of the other forms of polygamy or poly relationships
which actually exist in the real world, especially those outside of a closed society.143
It certainly cannot justify the continued criminalization of all forms of adult poly
relationships. It also assumes that all members of the society are heterosexual; it
assumes that no other forms of polyamorous relationships could form to encompass
every adult member of the society; and it also assumes that every man wants to or
is able to participate in the marital lifestyle or the poly lifestyle. The arithmetic
argument assumes that the resulting tableau of relationships would only be that of
polygyny. In reality, monogamous couples would still exist; some couples might be
homosexual or have bisexual triads; some group relationships of four or five adults
might form. The realities of decriminalizing polygamy would be that many forms of
adult relationships could result. The two “leftover” men, if they wanted to be in
relationships at all, could form relationships with any of these groups, or, as in
reality, be so undesirable as to remain single.144
The arithmetic argument is also flawed because it assumes that the same
relationship structures that we end up with—in which the billionaire has four
wives—would not occur if polygamy remained criminalized. In reality, a billionaire
would be more likely to have more than one “girlfriend” or mistress, and the two
remaining, low-brow unmarried men would still be considered as such in the
140

Id. at 1837 (alteration in original) (quoting Reference re: Section 293 of the Criminal
Code of Canada, 2011 BCSC 1588, para. 586).
141
Id. at 1835–36.
142
See id. at 1836–37.
143
See Turley, supra note 7, at 1918. The British Columbia Supreme Court dismissed
polyamorist interests with the following sweeping generalization: “Assuming that any
particular polyamorous relationship is captured by [section] 293 as I have interpreted it, I do
not agree that the provision infringes their . . . rights. What evidence I have that suggests that
polyamorists are a discrete group sharing truly common principles is scant. Polyamory is, I
conclude, a largely secular phenomenon, as varied in practice as the imagination of its
practitioners.” Id. at 1918–19 n.58 (quoting Reference re: Section 293 of the Criminal Code
of Canada, 2011 BCSC 1588, para. 1094).
144
The idea of an “old maid” man as a harm, as opposed to a romanticized “old
bachelor” is almost amusing to me, because “old maid” was coined to represent unmarried
women in society, which have existed for years.
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monogamous marriage market.145 Even in a monogamous society, the two “leftover”
men might still struggle to find partners, which can stem not just from the apparent
lack of available women within their closed society, but because of numerous factors
that are contributing to the overall decline in traditional marriage and the rise of
other forms of interpersonal and nonlegal relationships.146 Even within our current
monogamous system, criminalizing polygamy does not eradicate mistresses and the
natural imbalance that a capitalist society produces in choosing a partner. The
billionaire in the real world, instead of calling each woman his “wife” would simply
have her as his mistress, could still provide for each one with suitable living
arrangements, and could otherwise provide for their needs and any children
produced. The only difference is that the law criminalizes that behavior if he were
to call any of them his “wives” in public.
This harkens back to the public versus private argument that informs whether
Lawrence applies to polygamous cohabitation. Is the harm mere public affirmations
that someone is a “spouse” when they are not? If so, does no harm exist in private,
lifelong affairs that, while not publicly displayed, everyone otherwise knows about
and accepts? And what would be the resulting harm to society if we allowed the
billionaire to call his wife and his three mistresses his “spouses”? I posit that the
alleged harm stems from the State’s desire to control the question of marriage and
that public affirmations that someone is your spouse when they are not challenges

145

A recent study done by a psychology professor who testified as an expert in the
Reference 293 case concluded:
I give [the women] a choice: You’re in love with two men. One is a
billionaire, he already has one wife and he wants you to be his second wife. You’ll
be a billionairess; you will have your own island. . . . And then compare him—
just a regular guy, identical in every way, but you will just be his first wife. And
then the question to the women is, [“W]hat is the probability . . . that you would
be willing to go with the billionaire[?”], and I was surprised that 70 percent of my
female . . . undergraduates said they either would go with the billionaire, with a
75 percent or a hundred percent chance they’d marry the billionaire.
Reference re: Section 293 of the Criminal Code of Canada, 2011 BCSC 1588, para.
555.
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See, e.g., GUY GARCIA, THE DECLINE OF MEN: HOW THE AMERICAN MALE IS
TUNING OUT, GIVING UP, AND FLIPPING OFF HIS FUTURE, at xv (2008); HANNA ROSIN, THE
END OF MEN AND THE RISE OF WOMEN 93 (2012); D’vera Cohn et al., Barely Half of U.S.
Adults Are Married—A Record Low, PEW RES. CTR.: SOC. & DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS, Dec.
14, 2011, http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2011/12/14/barely-half-of-u-s-adults-are-married
-a-record-low/ [https://perma.cc/FMV2-A56W]; Aja Gabel, The Marriage Crisis: How
Marriage Has Changed in the Last 50 Years and Why It Continues to Decline, UNIV. VA.
MAGAZINE, Summer 2012, http://uvamagazine.org/features/article/the_marriage_crisis#.UZ
ZfYZVgPHg [https://perma.cc/AN82-KVDS].
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that control.147 That a public threat to the State’s control over marriage as a harm can
justify strict or heightened scrutiny, or even rational basis scrutiny, seems absurd.
(b) Uphold Ordered Liberty and Maintain the System of Law Based
on Monogamy
This challenge to the State’s control of marriage is reflected under this broad
idea that the decriminalization of polygamy would threaten social good as well.
Strassberg points out that the Reference’s social harms encompassed both previously
discussed individual harms, as abuse and subordination of women and children
harms the overall development of citizens in establishing their autonomy and selfidentity.148 Social harms also include some of the alleged administrative burdens that
might result from decriminalizing polygamy, as well as some more theoretical
threats to monogamy as the foundation of society.
Here, I address the argument that decriminalizing polygamy would somehow
threaten our vast network of laws based on monogamy and whether that “harm” is
sufficient to continue to outlaw the practice as a crime. Scholars have pointed out
that the desire to maintain laws based on monogamy are insufficient to justify
continued criminalization—just because it would require some rewriting of the laws
that we have long adhered to falls short.149 Many laws are grounded in the structure
that marriage is between two people. But at the same time, the laws have changed
over time to accommodate the legal rights of those who may have more than one
spouse over the course of a lifetime—or serial polygamy—which is allowed.150 For
example, in the social security context, if a claimant is married to a recipient for ten
years or more, regardless of whether he or she is that recipient’s current spouse, then
he or she is entitled to a portion of the social security benefits. 151 Although
decriminalizing polygamy would require some rewriting of our federal and state
marriage laws, this potential administrative headache is not enough to justify a
criminal ban on polygamy—in other words, it likely would not pass strict or
heightened scrutiny.152
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Strassberg, supra note 20, at 1834.
See, e.g., Strassberg, supra note 20, at 1828–30.
150
See Faucon, Marriage Outlaws, supra note 1, at 42 n.233 (citing Mary Ann
Glendon, Marriage and the State: The Withering Away of Marriage, 62 VA. L. REV. 663,
673 (1976)) (“Successive polygamy is so much in vogue in Western industrialized societies
that, far from forbidding it, the law of divorce, with its economic and child-related
consequences, is fast changing to adapt to it.”).
151
See 42 U.S.C. § 416 (2012); Smith v. Barnhart, 57 F. App’x 406, 408–09 (10th Cir.
2003); Albertson v. Apfel, 247 F.3d 448, 448 (2d Cir. 2001); Robinson v. Shalala, 1995 WL
681044, *1 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Contreras v. Sullivan, 1990 WL 357098, *2 (D. Ariz. 1990).
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See Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 102 n.9 (1972) (noting that for
fundamental rights, mere “administrative convenience” is not a compelling interest).
149
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I bring up this issue because I want to add that I am not sure why this has ever
been posited as a potential harm of decriminalizing polygamy. The need to maintain
laws based on two-person marital rights is not implicated by the decriminalization
of informal polygamy. The Browns here were not asking the court to find a
constitutional right to multiple legal marriages—they were simply asking the court
to decriminalize informal polygamy, and no “wife” asked the court to give her any
legal rights currently reserved for legal spouses.153 Decriminalization does not create
a positive right which would then require the legislatures to re-write marriage laws
to include legal polygamy.
Considering the current state of the polygamy debate today, however, the need
to identify the harms resulting from decriminalization are paramount—what is the
direct harm of polygamy that mandates its continued criminalization? Is it the mere
telling the public that a person is a polygamous spouse, which threatens our societal
traditions based on monogamy, which then threatens the State’s control over the
marital question? I do not think that the threat to the State’s control over acceptable
forms of adult relationships is sufficient to continue to criminalize the behavior. I
also do not think that arguments based in historical tradition are compelling
anymore,154 especially in the face of the expansion of marital rights in the social and
legal arenas,155 nor do I think that Enlightenment ideals, while partly responsible for
Western society’s development of self-identity,156 can justify modern marriage laws.
I am at a loss trying to pinpoint the exact societal harm,157 other than a public threat
to the State’s control over intimate adult relationships, which would result from
decriminalizing informal polygamy. It is no wonder that, absent any evidence of
harm presented by the defense in the Brown case, Judge Waddoups was compelled
to release informal polygamy from its criminal stigma.
III. THE LAW
Keeping in the mind the exact alleged harm isolated in the initial analysis, the
next step in the process is to determine the legal reaction in relation to that alleged
harm. By proceeding from the particularized harm, this allows us to zero in on
whether the law allows this type of restriction and, if so, under what confines. This
second step has two sub-inquiries—focusing first on determining the substantive
constitutional laws that should impact the regulation, and second on determining the
actual statutory language needed to define prohibited conduct from permissible
153

Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1178–79 (D. Utah 2013).
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003) (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)) (“[T]he fact that the governing majority in a
State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for
upholding a law prohibiting the practice . . . .”).
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See, e.g., Aviram & Leachman, supra note 1, at 290–96.
156
See Witte, Western Case, supra note 4, at 1677.
157
See also Turley, supra note 7, at 1970–71 (arguing that state action requires “more
tangible and direct statements of harm”).
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conduct. Both inquiries continue to mystify courts, legislators, and scholars.158 The
arguments made in the appeal to the Tenth Circuit, 159 as well as the legislative
responses by the Utah House,160 demonstrate the dire need to pick the strongest pony
moving forward next time there is occasion to challenge the constitutionality of the
anti-bigamy laws.
This section presents the current status of the Brown v. Buhman litigation,
analyzes the main arguments made on appeal, and discusses additional arguments
advanced by amici curiae. It then chronicles the oral arguments in the Brown case,
which occurred before the Tenth Circuit on January 21, 2016, focusing on the
questions that the panel asked regarding mootness and stare decisis. Furthermore,
this section discusses the Tenth Circuit’s decision to reverse the district court on
jurisdictional mootness grounds. The section concludes with a discussion of the
different approaches that the Tenth Circuit could have taken and the different legal
implications of each of those potential approaches.
A. The Appeal to the Tenth Circuit
On May 25, 2015, Buhman filed an appeal to the United States Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals.161 Buhman, now represented by Utah Federal Solicitor, Parker
Douglass, challenged the district court’s decision on rational basis review on the
plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment claim, the application of strict scrutiny to the
Browns’ Free Exercise claim, as well as the district court’s interpretation of the
statute. 162 A Tenth Circuit panel composed of Judges Matheson, Baldock, and
Moritz heard oral arguments on January 21, 2016 in Denver, Colorado.163
1. Arguments on Appeal
The briefs on appeal focus mainly on the district court’s ignoring Reynolds and
Potter, as they relate to the polygamy question in general as well as the use of strict
scrutiny for the Browns’ Free Exercise claim, the use of heightened scrutiny for the
Browns’ substantive Due Process claim, and the proper interpretation of the Utah
bigamy statute. This subsection presents the arguments made by parties on appeal in

158

See, e.g., Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (D. Utah 2013); Reference re:
Section 293 of the Criminal Code of Canada, 2011 BCSC 1588.
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See Brief of Appellant at 13–63, Brown v. Buhman, 822 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2016)
(No. 14-4117).
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H.B. 281, 61st Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2016), http://le.utah.gov/~2016/bills/static/
HB0281.html [https://perma.cc/4ZDY-B7AT]; H.B. 58, 60th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2014),
http://le.utah.gov/~2014/bills/static/HB0058.html [https://perma.cc/83TW-WC9S].
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Brief of Appellant, supra note 159, at 2.
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Id. at 11–12.
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Oral Argument, Brown v. Buhman, 822 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2016) (No. 14-4117)
(on file with author).
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the Brown litigation, with commentary in support of certain arguments taken from
the scholarly critiques following the publication of the decision.
(a) Buhman’s Appeal
Buhman’s appellate brief was hit or miss. Its stronger challenges to the district
court’s interpretations of Free Exercise and substantive Due Process were
undermined by its confused reply to the court’s statutory interpretation of the bigamy
statute164 and its failure to address the hybrid rights grounds used by the district
court.165
The substantive arguments in Buhman’s brief start with a compelling analysis
of applicable Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit cases, U.S. v. Reynolds and Potter v.
Murray City, respectively. The Tenth Circuit in Potter reaffirmed that Reynolds is
still controlling law and binding on the question of Free Exercise rights of
polygamists, which has never been overruled.166 Although I think that Reynolds is
outdated, archaic, and in need of re-examination, the weight of prior cases and the
district court’s decision to ignore them may have played a role in the Tenth Circuit’s
decision, at least in the substratum. A reliance on precedent and an apparent inability
to overturn prior rulings of the Tenth Circuit unless by en banc decision or Supreme
Court reversal also gave the panel a foundational principle of law to reverse the
district court decision without having to address the deeper constitutional issues.167
The arguments then invoke persuasive Utah Supreme Court cases that interpret
the bigamy statute differently than Judge Waddoups did. Strassberg’s thorough
164
165

Brief of Appellant, supra note 159, at 33–38.
Brief of Appellees at 2, Brown v. Buhman, 822 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2016) (No. 14-
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Brief of Appellant, supra note 159, at 18–19 (citing Potter v. Murray City, 760 F.2d
1065, 1067–70 (10th Cir. 1985)); see also Faucon, Polygamy After Windsor, supra note 2,
at 505 (citation omitted) (stating that “Reynolds still controls the analysis of ‘straightforward
polygamy or bigamy’”); Keith E. Sealing, Polygamists Out of the Closet: Statutory and State
Constitutional Prohibitions Against Polygamy Are Unconstitutional Under the Free
Exercise Clause, 17 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 691, 710–16 (2001) (discussing Reynolds and the
“anti-Mormon hysteria” caused by the practice of polygamy); Kenneth W. Starr, Liberty and
Equality Under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 1993 BYU L. REV. 1, 2 (noting
Justice Scalia invoked Reynolds in another case); Peter Nash Swisher, “I Now Pronounce
You Husband and Wives”: The Case for Polygamous Marriage After United States v.
Windsor and Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 29 BYU J. PUB. L. 299, 325 (2015) (stating
that Reynolds “continues to be recognized as binding legal authority in America”). In an oftquoted passage from Reynolds, the Court considered polygamy a distinctly non-Western
cultural trait—“Polygamy has always been odious among the northern and western nations
of Europe, and, until the establishment of the Mormon Church, was almost exclusively a
feature of the life of Asiatic and of African people.” Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145,
164 (1878).
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See generally Barnes v. United States, 776 F.3d 1134, 1136–37 (10th Cir. 2015)
(affirming the district court’s order).
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critique of the district court’s decision tracks the historical development and
legislative intent of the different iterations of Utah’s polygamy statute up to the
current version at issue.168 The modern wording stems from a series of legislative
reactions to the behaviors of polygamists in their attempts to skirt the technical
language of the prohibition in the statute.169 In reaction to this behavior, the statutes
were later amended to include “purport to marry” and “cohabitation,” which would
allow for a more objective use of evidence.170 The effect of this language is that the
current Utah statute is meant to capture both attempts at multiple marriage licenses
and attempts at informal cohabitation, with or without evidence of a marriage
ceremony. The interpretations of “purports to marry” and the “cohabitation” prong
in two Utah Supreme Court polygamy cases, State v. Green and State v. Holm,
certainly do not limit “purport to marry” to attempts at multiple marriage licenses.171
The critique is that the judge in the Brown case misinterpreted the statute when
measured against the interpretations by the Utah Supreme Court.172
I also agree with that critique. The “purports to marry” and “cohabitation”
prongs should be interpreted together, as their intent is to capture nonlegal marriage
ceremonies and other public indicia of a married husband and wife. That would
mean that the Brown family relationships would actually fit into the “purporting to
marry” category and the “cohabitation” category. I do agree with Judge Waddoups,
however, in his analysis that the cohabitation prong is vague when interpreted on its
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Strassberg, Scrutinizing Polygamy, supra note 20, at 1844–49.
See id. In Reynolds v. United States, the first U.S. Supreme Court case to address
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unconstitutionally vague. 99 P.3d 820, 834 (Utah 2004). In State v. Holm, the Utah Supreme
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includes religious “marriage” ceremonies. 137 P.3d 726, 732 (Utah 2006).
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Strassberg, Scrutinizing Polygamy, supra note 20, at 1844–49; see also Rains, supra
note 28, at 362–64 (criticizing Judge Waddoups’ analysis in Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp.
2d 1170 (D. Utah 2013)); White, supra note 90, at 696 (stating that “the district court
incorrectly interpreted the United States Supreme Court precedent in its application of the
Free Exercise Clause to the Statute”).
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plain language—the statute clearly has an “or” between the two provisions. 173
Further, even if the court had measured the Browns’ conduct under the Utah
Supreme Court’s interpretation of “purports to marry,” that prong is still open to the
same constitutional attacks based in substantive Due Process, Free Exercise of
Religion, Equal Protection, and Free Speech.
These early challenges to the district court’s decision are likely the strongest
substantive arguments as to why the decision was inappropriate on the merits. The
brief starts to go off the rails when it begins to critique the district court’s reading of
the statute. Buhman argues that instead of reading the “purports to marry” prong and
the “cohabitation” prong as disjunctive, the court should have inserted an “and” to
thus read the statute conjunctively.174 In other words, the appellant argues that after
finding the statute vague, the district court should have rewritten the statute to read
as follows: “A person is guilty of bigamy when, knowing he has a husband or wife
or knowing the other person has a husband or wife, the person purports to marry
another person [and] cohabits with another person.”175 This particular argument that
the trial court should have substituted the “or” with an “and” was ill founded,
especially when, as Strassberg previously indicated, sensible alternative
interpretations of the statute exist already that do not require an absurd retreat to
rewriting disjunctive terms with conjunctive ones.176
The next substantive locus of Buhman’s argument challenged the district
court’s use of heightened scrutiny based on Lawrence to the Browns’ substantive
Due Process claim. The argument is that the private acts at issue in Lawrence are
protected but that the public acts at issue in polygamous marriage “presents the exact
conduct identified by the Supreme Court in Lawrence as outside the scope of its
holding.” 177 Related to that argument, Professor Robert E. Rains asserts that
Lawrence protects persons in their intimate relationships from government
intrusions into their dwelling or other private place.178 Rains argues that the Brown
family’s conduct is distinguishable from that at the heart of Lawrence: “It is difficult
to perceive what privacy is involved with relationships which the Brown plaintiffs
have seen fit to broadcast on a nationally syndicated television show or how they
could possibly have standing to assert any privacy argument.”179
Honing in on the private versus public conduct distinction splinters the liberty
interest asserted by polygamists in two. While that differentiation may take part of
173

UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-101 (West 2010), invalidated by Brown v. Herbert, 43 F.
Supp. 3d 1229 (D. Utah 2014).
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Brief of Appellant, supra note 159, at 35–40.
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Id. at 37 (alterations in original).
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Strassberg, Scrutinizing Polygamy, supra note 20, at 1845–49.
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State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726, 743 (Utah 2006).
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the liberty interest of polygamists outside of the protection of Lawrence, this does
not preclude Lawrence’s application to the private aspects of polygamy. It appears
the public versus private conduct distinction is paramount in whether Lawrence or
some other constitutionally limiting principle can protect the conduct of “public”
polygamous families within its penumbra.
(b) The Browns’ Response
The Browns, represented by Professor Turley, were quick to grab two, lowhanging counterarguments. First, the Browns pointed out the absurdity of Buhman’s
new statutory interpretation argument that the district court should have imposed an
“and” for an “or” in the statute in order to save it from unconstitutional vagueness.180
I will not repeat the entirety of that argument, but will only point out that the panel
did not place much stock in this argument on appeal. 181 Second, the Browns
highlighted Buhman’s failure in his brief to challenge the district court’s striking of
the cohabitation prong using the hybrid rights grounds.182 This effectively waived
this ground to challenge the decision on appeal.
Scholars also critique the court’s use of strict scrutiny under the hybrid rights
analysis set out in Wisconsin v. Yoder183 to the Browns’ Free Exercise claim.184 The
hybrid rights analysis requires a finding that a practice restricts the Free Exercise of
Religion in conjunction with its restricting another fundamental and constitutionally
protected right.185 The Yoder case involved the rights of Amish parents to defy a
public law requiring all children to attend public school until at least the eighth grade
in compliance with their Amish beliefs. In Yoder, the Court held that religious belief
coupled with a parent’s fundamental right to determine the education and upbringing
of his or her children, subjected the public school requirement to strict scrutiny.186
The Yoder decision can be criticized as an aberration in the court’s otherwise ordered
Free Exercise analyses.187 Second, scholars argue that, in the context of polygamy,
no hybrid right exists as the Supreme Court has never defined or included the right
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Brief of Appellees, supra note 165, at 8–12.
See Oral Argument, supra note 163, at 12:45.
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Brief of Appellees, supra note 165, at 59–62.
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406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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See id. at 247 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990) (describing the hybrid
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Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215–17.
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While I was previously neutral on Yoder’s propriety, I now argue against its merits.
I think the opinion in Yoder was results-oriented, focusing more on glamorizing the beautiful
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to polygamous marriage, informal or otherwise, as a fundamental one.188 While I
agree that the hybrid rights grounds should be re-examined in general, I disagree
with the reactionary scholarship that argues that polygamy is not a protected
fundamental right that can support a hybrid rights analysis, as I will explain more
thoroughly below.
The more intricate substantive arguments focus on upholding the district
court’s decisions to use strict scrutiny for the Free Exercise challenge and heightened
scrutiny under the substantive Due Process challenge. The Browns argued that the
district court was correct to look past Reynolds and Potter in light of subsequent
Supreme Court cases, as Reynolds is no longer “good law.”189 The Browns further
argued that state tests used to interpret federal constitutional rights are not
controlling on a federal court.190 The brief also supports the district court’s decision
by arguing that, even if strict or heightened scrutiny do not apply to either claim, the
statute would still fail under rational basis review and that the statute is
unconstitutionally vague.191 Peppered throughout the Browns’ brief are references
to Buhman’s failure to introduce any evidence of harm to the district court. 192
Without any evidence of harms, they argue, the statute cannot pass even a rational
basis review—the court cannot do the fit test at all in fact. Considering the additional
confusion added by the potential numerous ways to read the “cohabitation” portion
of the statute, the Browns maintain that the district court was correct in striking it
from the statute.193
(c) Buhman’s Reply
Buhman’s reply brief focused on two main points: that Reynolds and Potter are
still binding precedent that compel reversal of the district court and that Browns’
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Strassberg, Scrutinizing Polygamy, supra note 20, at 1867–69.
Brief of Appellees, supra note 165, at 13–14 (citing Faucon, Polygamy After
Windsor, supra note 1, at 496); Keith E. Sealing, Polygamists Out of the Closet: Statutory
and State Constitutional Prohibitions Against Polygamy Are Unconstitutional Under the
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asserted fundamental rights are nonexistent as the harms attendant to polygamous
practices are legitimate subjects of Utah’s police powers.194
2. Arguments by Amici Curiae Eagle Forum and CATO Institute
The court received three briefs from amici curiae, two submitted on behalf of
Buhman, and one submitted on behalf of the Browns. I briefly discuss two, the Eagle
Forum Education and Legal Defense Fund and the CATO Institute.195 The main
thrust of the Eagle Forum’s argument was that the district court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to hear the case, an issue that has loomed over this litigation since its
inception.196 Given the lack of any criminal enforcement proceedings against the
Browns, the argument is “[s]uits to declare marriage rights—including rights to the
unlicensed ‘quasi-marriages’ here—fall under the domestic-relations exception to
federal jurisdiction.”197 Coupled with the Reynolds decision’s control of the issue,
the federal controversy is too insubstantial to confer jurisdiction and, in any event,
“[f]ederal courts do not sit as a super state legislature, [and] may not impose [their]
own narrowing construction . . . if the state courts have not already done so.”198 The
jurisdictional argument is a pertinent one that ultimately disposed of the case at the
Tenth Circuit, but not in the approach urged by Eagle Forum.199
The Cato Institute amici curiae brief enhanced and raised an argument hinted
at in the Browns’ response brief—that Utah’s bigamy statute criminalizes speech,
and that the restriction on speech in the statute is unconstitutional because it does
not fall within any exceptions. 200 Further, the brief argues that the law is not
narrowly tailored to support any compelling governmental interest and that speech
cannot be restricted on the grounds that it may incite people to engage in potentially
socially harmful conduct.201
194

Reply Brief of Appellant at 6, Brown v. Buhman, 822 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2016)
(No. 14-4117).
195
The brief for the Sound Choices Coalition, Inc. on behalf of Buhman, supplies the
court with an analysis on polygamy’s harms, arguing that polygamy harms women and
children and that the laws are narrowly tailored to advance these compelling interests. Brief
for Amicus Curiae Sound Choices Coal., Inc. Supporting Appellant-Defendant & Reversal
at 1–8, Brown v. Buhman, 822 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2016) (No. 14-4117).
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Brief for Amicus Curiae Eagle Forum Educ. & Legal Def. Fund in Support of
Appellant & Reversal at 4–17, Brown v. Buhman, 822 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2016) (No. 144117).
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Id. at 3.
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Id. at 20 (quoting United Food & Commercial Workers Intern. Union, AFL-CIO,
CLC v. IBP, Inc., 857 F.2d 422, 431 (8th Cir. 1988)).
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The Eagle Forum position is that the domestic relations exception to subject matter
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Brief of the Cato Inst., supra note 7, at 14.
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Id. at 14–23.
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The argument looks to the prohibited conduct at issue in the statute—
“purporting to marry” another person or cohabiting with another person. In practice,
this means engaging in a religious (or non-religious) ceremony or engaging in
marital-like conduct and calling someone a “spouse” or saying “that’s my wife,”
even if the marriage is not legally recognized. The Cato Institute concludes from
this: “Indeed, the statute criminalizes speech that creates and maintains intimate
associations between consenting adults, and communicates freely chosen religious
and moral values. The bigamy statute thus restricts protected and valuable speech
because of its content, and is therefore presumptively unconstitutional.” 202
Completing the analysis, the brief argues that the statute is not narrowly tailored to
any compelling state interest and that it is over-inclusive as to “any interest in
preventing fraud, domestic abuse, or child sexual abuse.”203
The Cato Institute position helped to crystallize the exact conduct or alleged
public harm sought to be at the heart of the polygamy bans—calling someone a
spouse in public when they are not or otherwise acting like married persons when
one is already married. While I have hinted that this harm relates to threatening the
State’s control over marriage, the Cato Institute’s brief frames the constitutional
analysis based on the substance of improper state control over speech and
association. 204 For me, the novelty of this approach in the religious polygamy
context provides yet another potential ground to challenge polygamy bans in any
future litigation—a Free Speech ground. This could potentially lead to the use of a
“tri-brid” rights grounds in the context of religious-based polygamy—substantive
Due Process, Free Exercise of Religion, and Free Speech.

202
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3. Oral Arguments
On January 21, 2016, a Tenth Circuit panel composed of Judges Matheson,
Baldock, and Moritz heard oral arguments in Brown v. Buhman in Denver,
Colorado.205 As I was currently a fellow at the University of Denver, Sturm College
of Law, I attended oral arguments, in addition to many interested law students, law
professors, and media. Most of the seats were filled by the time oral argument began
at 8:30 a.m. The panel’s questions focused on three main issues: standing and
mootness (an issue raised sua sponte by the panel), the evidence of religious
targeting to support strict scrutiny of the Free Exercise claim, and the interpretation
of the Utah statute in a manner that differs from the Utah Supreme Court.
(a) Buhman’s Oral Argument
The attorney for Buhman, Parker Douglas, first approached the lectern, and
before he could complete his opening, Judge Matheson asked counsel about the
court’s sua sponte mootness issue and whether the district court was correct in
proceeding on the merits.206 Douglas did point out, to the surprise of the court, that
a bill was introduced in the House in Utah that week which changed the “or” in the
statute to an “and” in response to the district court decision.207 Douglas then returned
to the mootness question. The court pointed out that standing is determined at the
time the complaint is filed, but it wanted to know if there is a difference between a
mere investigation and a threat of prosecution and whether investigation alone is
enough for an injury.208 The panel focused on whether there was a credible threat of
prosecution given the fact that the Browns now live in Nevada.209 Judge Baldock
stressed this point, asking counsel in numerous ways how the Browns could be
prosecuted by Utah County for acts committed in Utah now that they live in
Nevada. 210 Quite incredulously, Douglas responded that they could not be
prosecuted now, a position he had to take given his underlying position of arguing
that no case or controversy exists.211
Judge Baldock briefly addressed defendant’s argument in his brief that the
district court should have substituted an “and” for the “or” in the statute—to which
Judge Baldock quickly imposed that he would not be inclined to do. Deflecting and
minimizing that argument (although not a bad one considering the recent action by
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the Utah House in accordance with that statutory suggestion),212 Douglas instead
focused on the private conduct versus public conduct distinction that he thinks is
covered in the statute.213 Baldock asked whether Windsor and Obergefell have any
impact on the cohabitation conduct in this case, to which Douglas responded that
those cases involve recognition of marriage rights and not decriminalization of
conduct, which is what is at issue here.214
At this point, Judge Matheson asked pointed questions as to why counsel did
not specifically challenge the district court’s hybrid rights analysis in its brief, and
whether that means the argument is waived on appeal. Somewhat of an implied
berate of his lack of briefing on the issue, counsel’s response was well-reasoned—
he cited a case which found that two questionable constitutional claims do not make
up a hybrid rights claim, and then he pointed out that his brief addressed how both
constitutional challenges are insufficient.215 Matheson then asked why there was no
introduction of evidence of harm at the district court level. At this point, Douglas
reminded the panel that the defendant was previously represented by different
attorneys (who no longer hold their positions), and that he was simply bound at this
point by the record in this case.216 What Douglas does instead is try to cite cases
which find harm and then say that citations to these cases are sufficient as evidence
of harm.217 He used the Tenth Circuit case, Kitchen v. Herbert,218 (which Douglas
also argued before the Tenth Circuit), which allowed citations to social science
papers as evidence.219 While not further pressed on this issue, the Kitchen case is
distinguishable as social science papers in terms of evidence are not the same as case
law. The former is used to establish a fact, and not the law as an opinion can do.
The defendant’s oral argument ended with Judge Moritz asking counsel how
the State can even justify a rational basis for the statute in light it of its rare
enforcement or use only to find evidence of other crimes.220 In response, Douglas
argued that the statute is used to prosecute bigamists along with fraud and sexual
abuse, that the statute allows them to find evidence of these other crimes, and that,
essentially, it is a common practice that has been recognized by the Tenth Circuit
recently. Finally, Judge Baldock asked what the defendant’s single best argument
moving forward was; he responded by pointing out that the court is bound by Potter
and Reynolds, which remains good law.221
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(b) The Browns’ Oral Argument in Response
Like with the appellant, most of the panel’s questions to counsel for the Brown
family focused on mootness and standing. While there was some opening argument
about whether the defendant waived the mootness issue on appeal, Judge Matheson
quickly pointed out that a litigant cannot waive the court’s jurisdiction, especially
considering in this instance the panel raised the question sua sponte.
Judge Moritz returned to the “credible threat of injury” inquiry and how
plaintiffs’ allegations are actionable. Turley responded that Kody Brown executed
an affidavit stating that he would like to move back to Utah where the center of their
church is located. Turley also raised an additional injury grounded in the free speech
angle—that the law has a “chilling effect,” which is specifically injurious in Free
Speech cases under Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass’n Inc.222 Further, Turley
argued that singling this family out and calling them “felons” has an injurious effect
to them individually because they stopped giving public speeches in Utah as a
result. 223 Even though they did not discontinue the airing of their show, calling
“public figures” such as the Browns felons is injurious. At another point in the oral
argument, Turley returned to this argument to remind the panel not to ignore the
“chilling effect” on speech.224
Judge Matheson introduced the next focus of inquiry by asking what evidence
exists in the record that shows the law is only enforced against religious polygamists
and not secular ones.225 Turley pointed to the admissions and comments made by
defense counsel to Judge Waddoups during the motion for summary judgment.226 In
that argument, the defendant admitted that the State only enforces the law against
religious polygamists. Those admissions, Turley argued, are binding, and the
defendant did not argue the Geer case, in which a secular polygamist was
prosecuted, to the trial judge.227 Although pressed numerous times for any other
evidence in the record of religious targeting, counsel again returned to the trial
court’s findings and the admissions made in court.228
The last main section of inquiry involved the district court’s ability, as a federal
court, to interpret a state bigamy statute in a manner that differs from the
interpretation by the Utah Supreme Court.229 In somewhat of a humorous exchange
222
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between Professor Turley and Judge Baldock, Turley stated that he might ask that
question on an exam, to which Baldock responded, “I can tell you that if you say
that they can do that, we’ve just learned some new constitutional law.”230 At the
same time, Turley never gave a clear answer, while he did point out that federal
courts are not bound by state interpretations of federal constitutional questions,
Judge Matheson pointed out that they are referring to the “purports to marry” and
statutory interpretations of the Utah Supreme Court.231 Turley closed his argument
by pointing out that Reynolds can still be cited for bans against multiple marriage
licenses.
On reserved time, Douglas pointed out that colloquy with the district court is
not a record of religious targeting and that the court was not bound by defendant’s
answers to the court’s questions.232 The court inquired into the legislative intent of
the Utah ban, even looking to the original irrevocable ordinances from 1890,233 but
allowed counsel to end by arguing that the current bans do not target religious
polygamists.234 At the end of reserved time, in somewhat of a break from procedural
etiquette, but allowed by the court, Turley made a few closing statements answering
the court’s question about scrutiny levels, at first speaking from his bench but then
walking up to the lectern mid-sentence. He quickly stated that the district court did
announce different standards for religious cohabitors and non-religious ones in the
opinion.235 The oral arguments then closed after running over allotted time by almost
double.
B. The Tenth Circuit Opinion
Considering the court’s sua sponte standing and mootness inquiries and the
large portion of the oral arguments dedicated to those issues, it is no surprise that the
Tenth Circuit reversed the district court on jurisdictional mootness grounds. This
allowed the Tenth Circuit to reverse the district court without having to answer the
constitutional merits. At the same time, the appeals court had substantive grounds to
reverse the decision based on prior precedent. With that result, the current status of
the law returns to its interpretations under Potter and, thus, under the Utah Supreme
Court interpretations. 236 The additional wrinkle of the new Utah legislation that
Buhman’s counsel brought to the attention of the panel, although an attempt to
amend the statute, still falls prey to the constitutional challenges in a conjunctive
230
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form. With the court’s jurisdictional punt, we are left guessing at how the Tenth
Circuit would analyze the deeper, and much thornier, underlying constitutional
protections at stake.
1. Reversal on Mootness Grounds
After oral arguments, it seemed likely that the Tenth Circuit would decide the
appeal on either jurisdictional grounds, prior precedent, or a combination of both.
When the Tenth Circuit published its decision on April 11, 2016, the panel avoided
the case law altogether and instead reversed on jurisdictional mootness grounds.237
The Tenth Circuit held that the case was moot because the Utah County Attorney’s
Office adopted a policy that it would not bring a bigamy prosecution against an
offender unless he or she (1) induces a partner to marry through misrepresentation
or (2) is suspected of committing a collateral crime, such as fraud or abuse.238 The
Tenth Circuit stated that, because of this adopted policy, the district court erred in
proceeding to the merits as the case “ceased to qualify as an Article III case or
controversy.”239
Under its mootness analysis, the Tenth Circuit found that the Browns were
“under no credible threat of prosecution.”240 To reach this result, the court engaged
in a three-part inquiry. First, the court found that the Browns complaint only sought
prospective relief, and not relief for past injuries. This finding allowed the court to
then limit the district court’s proper inquiry to whether any injury continued now or
into the future. Second, within that prospective frame work, the court found that
Buhman’s adoption of the “office policy” not to prosecute the Browns and the
Browns’ move to Nevada “eliminated any reasonable expectation that the Browns
will be prosecuted . . . .”241 Finally, the court responded to the four arguments the
Browns made against a finding of mootness. In particular, that (1) Winsness v.
Yocum,242 in which the Tenth Circuit found mootness, is distinguishable and requires
a finding of ripeness here; that (2) the office policy adopted by Buhman could
change after he leaves; that (3) Buhman continues to uphold the statute’s
constitutionality; and that (4) Buhman adopted the office policy in order to moot the
case.243
The aim of this subsection is not to address each step in the Tenth Circuit’s
analysis,244 as I generally agree with its initial finding that the Browns’ complaint
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cannot support a claim for damages and requests proscriptive relief only. 245 But
within that restricted scope of inquiry, I do take some issue with the court’s finding
that there was “no reasonable expectation that Mr. Buhman will violate” the office
policy. 246 Particularly, I question the court’s treatment of that standard under its
interpretation of Winsness and Mink v. Suthers. 247 The district court, relying on
Mink’s interpretation of Winsness, used the three “Winsness factors” to determine
whether or not a credible threat of prosecution existed. 248 The Tenth Circuit’s
opinion takes great pains to explain that the three “Winsness factors” used in
Winsness and Mink did not “purport to state a definitive test that would govern in
every case.” 249 The “Winsness factors,” according to the Tenth Circuit, merely
“described some evidence supporting the prosecutors’ credibility, not a doctrinal
test.”250
In Winsness, the plaintiff was cited by the police for burning a symbol onto an
American flag and hanging it from his garage.251 The district attorney dismissed the
charge of flag abuse before trial. Afterward, Winsness filed a § 1983 action, arguing
that the Utah flag-abuse statute violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments.252 In
an affidavit filed with the court, the Salt Lake County district attorney declared that
he had no intention of prosecuting anyone under the flag-abuse statute as its
enforceability was doubtful in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Texas v.
Johnson.253 He further declared that “until the constitutional doubts about the Utah
statute are eliminated through a constitutional amendment or a new decision of the
United States Supreme Court, [he had] no intention of prosecuting . . . anyone
. . . under the statute.” 254 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit held that Winsness lacked
standing and that the affidavits mooted the case.255 Weighing these facts together,
the court stated that the “veracity of these affidavits is bolstered both by the
prosecutors’ actions, quickly repudiating the citation against Mr. Winsness, and by
245
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Texas v. Johnson, which gives the prosecutors good reason to avoid initiating
potentially futile prosecutions.”256
The next year, in Mink, the Tenth Circuit considered the mootness of a
constitutional challenge to Colorado’s criminal libel statute pre-enforcement or
prosecution.257 In Mink, the court discussed Winsness and found that in Mink, the
prosecutor’s “assurances established mootness since the government (1) had quickly
repudiated the action initially taken against Winsness, (2) its statements were made
in sworn affidavits, and (3) it based its decision on controlling Supreme Court
precedent, making future prosecution unlikely.” 258 The court then stated that the
“factors” as present in Mink weighed against a finding of ripeness.259 In Brown, the
Tenth Circuit held that the district court erred in relying on the “Winsness factors,”
emphasizing that “Winsness represents a fact-specific application of [a] general
rule,” 260 and that the district court erred in limiting its analysis to weighing the
“Winsness factors” and “ignored the broader lesson of Winsness and Mink: that
evidence supporting the veracity of the decision and the policy not to prosecute is
important to the mootness analysis. That evidence need not be limited to the
‘Winsness factors.’”261
Accepting that the Tenth Circuit’s explanation in Brown of the controlling and
probative value of Winsness is just that, a clarification of the use of “Winsness
factors,” the issue then becomes one of rhetoric and context. If the Tenth Circuit did
not intend the three factual circumstances in Winsness to be used or considered as
legally probative “factors,” then the court’s use and interpretation of the “Winsness
factors” in Mink certainly did not do this current panel any favors to that end. Mink’s
use of the phrase “Winsness factors” and then its explicit numbering of the three
factors in a (1), (2), and (3) manner,262 signals to a legally trained mind, if not even
a lay person, that the following three items listed are indeed “factors” that have some
doctrinal weight. The fact that Mink further measured the facts present in that case
against the three “Winsness factors” in the same manner that lawyers are
traditionally taught to analyze facts against factors further belies the court’s current
interpretation here.
Accepting then that Winsness and Mink instead stand for a much broader
balancing test to weigh the facts to indicate that an official is unlikely to repeat the
unlawful conduct, that means we have to look at each case, including this one,
holistically. In this case, the whole of the facts should at least rise to the same level
of reasonable assurances found in Winsness and Mink. This is another sub-issue,
upon closer inspection, where the Tenth Circuit decision in Brown may not pass
muster. The court lists four facts in Brown that weighed in favor of finding “no
reasonable expectation” that Buhman would violate the office policy:
256
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First, he announced an office policy that would prevent prosecution of the
Browns and others similarly situated in the future. Second, the UCAO
Policy is essentially the same as the AG Policy, which the district court
considered sufficient to deny the Browns standing to sue the Governor and
the Attorney General. Third, the UCAO Policy and the decision not to
prosecute the Browns are contained in a declaration that was signed under
penalty of perjury and submitted to the federal district court. Fourth,
violation of the declaration would expose Mr. Buhman to prosecution for
perjury or contempt.263
The court continues throughout the analysis to remind the parties that a violation of
the office policy could subject Buhman to perjury charges, as if to point out the
weight of this particular fact.264 But I think the court makes too much of it, at least
with respect to how this particular factual situation was treated in Winsness. In
Winsness, the Salt Lake County district attorney also filed a sworn affidavit with the
court, which also subjected its speaker to potential prosecution for perjury, but which
did not need to be so explicitly drawn out into allegedly separate supporting facts.265
In that regard, facts three and four listed above would be just one consideration.
What remains for comparison is (1) in Brown, similar office policies adopted
by the Utah attorney general’s office were found sufficient to dismiss the governor
and attorney general from the suit, but (2) in Winsness and Mink, the office policy
was supported by a Supreme Court case stating that the laws in question were
unconstitutional.266 The fact remains that, even in Mink, where the office policy not
to prosecute was never formalized in an affidavit and submitted to the court, the
court found the office policy weighed in favor of finding mootness. 267 With the
Brown case in particular, the import of this factor becomes even more compelling
because the district court released the governor and attorney general offices based
on similar formal policies in the attorney general’s office.
The most glaring difference with the Brown case, however, is the absence of
any Supreme Court or even district court decision, as in Mink, finding that the Utah
anti-bigamy law is unconstitutional. With respect to polygamy, the opposite exists—
we have numerous Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit opinions saying criminal antibigamy statutes are constitutional. While the panel seemed to dismiss this distinction
at oral argument as a trivial one, it was a huge consideration behind the court’s
analyses in Winsness and Mink.268 At least comparing the facts in Brown holistically
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against the facts present in Winsness and Mink, the Brown case certainly did not rise
to the same level of reasonable certainty as in those cases.
Assuming the test really is a holistic one, and not one tied to three doctrinal
factors, then the facts present in Brown did not rise to the same levels as Winsness
and Mink. However, this does not mean that the facts present in Brown should not
have been sufficient to support a finding of mootness, especially considering the
previous rulings on mootness as to the governor and attorney general based on
similar formal office policies.269 But it does aim to point out that the facts were at
least not as strong as those present in Winsness and Mink.
The fact that Buhman’s successor could change the office policy at any time
was also unavailable to the defendants in Winsness and Mink because another case
held that conduct unconstitutional.270 This becomes more important than the court
gives it credit. The ability to change the office policy at any time may not have
defeated the Browns’ mootness claim in this particular instance or against this
particular defendant, but it becomes problematic on a larger scale because of what it
ultimately perpetuates and implicitly encourages.
It implicitly encourages leaving a potentially unconstitutional law on its face
on the books, as it reflects the majority’s general moral disapproval of the conduct,
while only staving off prosecution for potentially another day. This raises a whole
host of issues relating to the symbolic functions of laws in desuetude that remain the
law, to which I do not address here.271 While I am critiquing the Tenth Circuit’s
decision on the narrow issue of Winsness, as it is part of my job to do, I certainly
understand why the Tenth Circuit chose to intervene and reverse the case in the
manner that they did.
While the Brown litigation is ripe with “lessons learned” for the next attempt at
decriminalizing polygamy, the Brown decision will also stand for what it could have
been in the pantheon of influential equality cases. This case could have been the
equivalent of a Lawrence for the decriminalization of informal polygamy,272 and it
indeed had all of the initial trappings to be that—a “model” plaintiff polygamous
family, a well-versed constitutional law professor acting as lead counsel, 273 and
following on the heels of the expansion of marriage equality rights with Windsor
and Obergefell.274 Instead, this case will likely be remembered for what it could have
been. This decision could also discourage polygamy proponents as yet another
judicial blow to their attempts at decriminalization, a result that could turn even more
269
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poly proponents away from the judicial forum as a method to challenge polygamy
bans. On the other hand, the decision could galvanize polygamy proponents to
present a stronger case that will, at least procedurally, break through any potential
jurisdictional barriers so as to get an analysis on the merits.
2. Current Status of the Law
The Utah legislative responses to the Utah district court decision further
evidences the need for more clarity on how to write the statute in order to capture
the type of behavior that is permissibly outlawed. Immediately following the
decision, Rep. Jerry B. Anderson filed HB 58 in January 2014, which proposed to
remove “cohabitation” as an element of the offense of bigamy.275 Anderson stated,
“[t]o relieve our attorney general and all of our law enforcement, I think this is a step
in the right direction . . . . Besides being in line with the First Amendment religious
liberty. . . . I think it’s a good bill to get in line with the reality of what’s going on.”276
The proposed changes would read: “A person is guilty of bigamy when, knowing he
or she has a husband or wife or knowing the other person has a husband or wife, the
person purports to marry another person.” 277 Notably, the cohabitation prong is
removed in its entirety. On March 13, 2014, however, the Bill failed to make it out
of the House.278
Immediately following oral arguments, media asked counsel for Defendant
about the “surprise” bill that Defendant raised during oral arguments. “I think it
clarifies who might be covered by the law. The reason for it is to give the public
precise knowledge of what is criminal and what is not.”279 Who exactly was running
the bill was unknown at the time, but Douglas stated that he was obligated to report
the news to the panel of judges.280 The “surprise” bill that Defendant raised actually
referred to Utah HB 281, sponsored by Rep. Michael E. Noel, and later introduced
on February 3, 2016, merely a week and a half after oral arguments in the case.281
The proposed amendment would read: “A person is guilty of bigamy when, knowing
[the person] has a husband or wife or knowing the other person has a husband or
wife, the person purports to marry [and] cohabitates with [the other] person.”282 This
275
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proposed legislation makes the statute gender neutral and does, indeed, attempt to
insert an “and” in place of the “or,” thus requiring reading both sections together.
The issue with changing the “or” to an “and” is that reading the prohibited
conduct to contain both private and public aspects of polygamy requires a showing
of both. Further, this amendment does not change the underlying conduct prohibited
under the original interpretation of the statute with “or” inserted. Although the
language would make conduct prohibited a little less vague, in that it would now
exclude adulterers from its scope who do not otherwise “purport to marry” one
another, it still subjects the prohibited conduct to the same substantive constitutional
attacks that do not hinge on vagueness arguments. As the bill is currently on the
house floor, it is unclear at this point whether it will pass or whether it will fall prey
to same fate as HB 58.283
The Tenth Circuit’s disposal of the case on jurisdictional grounds, as well as
Utah H.B. 281, leaves the contours of the law around polygamy in flux. Absent the
proposed bill, the Tenth Circuit’s opinion re-affirms the law in the Circuit as
established over thirty years ago in Potter v. Murray City.284 This means that the
current legal test used to measure polygamy bans under constitutional tests is
rational basis, 285 and that the Utah Supreme Court interpretations control the
definition of “purports to marry” and “cohabitation.”
As Strassberg previously outlined, the outlawed behavior would include four
forms of polygamy.286 The “purports to marry” language would cover the following:
1. “Fraudulent bigamy” in which a person unknowingly “marries” someone who
already has a legal spouse; 2. “Legal polygamy” in which a person attempts to obtain
multiple legal marriages; and 3. “Polygamous marriage” in which multiple religious
marriage-like ceremonies occur while only one marriage is legally valid. The
“cohabitation” prong is meant to cover the last form of polygamy identified by
Strassberg as boxed in by the statute: 4. “Polygamous cohabitation” in which
multiple marital relationships exist. 287 Interpreting each clause against its
jurisprudential historical definitions aids in applying what would otherwise be a
vague statute on its face.
C. Alternative Approaches
With the easy out on jurisdictional and prior precedent grounds, poly
proponents are left to postulate as to what else the court could have done to define
the law as it relates to the criminal polygamy laws. This subsection addresses some
alternative approaches that the Tenth Circuit could have taken to dispose of this case
and then provides a brief discussion of the implications of each particular route. The
aim of providing alternative formulations of the law in the context of
283
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decriminalization is to provide future litigants and legislators with potential
arguments in which to ground their approach, while at the same time using the flaws
and their effects on the different routes as “lessons-learned.”
1. Free Exercise of Religion Grounds
As far as providing substantive support for the law, the panel could have
addressed the question on Free Exercise of Religion grounds. Some scholars have
argued that the Free Exercise jurisprudence provides religious polygamists with the
strongest constitutional case to decriminalize polygamy because of deference given
religious adherents. 288 The litigants are correct in this instance in relying on the
district court’s interpretation and application of Hialeah as the bigamy statute is
neutral and generally applicable on its face.289 In this case, the justification for either
strict scrutiny or rational basis review will then depend on how the court would
square the evidence of religious targeting in enforcement. If the appeals court had
found that it was bound to the trial court’s finding and Defendant’s admissions that
law enforcement only targets religious polygamists, as opposed to secular ones, then
the court would have to apply strict scrutiny. 290 But if the panel found that
Defendant’s admissions and trial court’s findings on the issue of religious targeting
was not a factual one and somehow relied on the example of State v. Geer,291 then
the court would have to apply rational basis review. In this case in particular, the
level of scrutiny used is almost irrelevant because of the defendant’s lack of evidence
of harms to support either a compelling or rational state interest.
The difficulty in using the Free Exercises approach, however, is that Reynolds
and Potter seem to control the Free Exercise analysis already. Litigants in both of
those cases asserted the unconstitutionality of the bigamy statute based on Free
Exercise of Religion.292 While Reynolds was decided in 1878 before the Court had
developed its jurisprudence on testing the fit of restrictive statutes—indeed Reynolds
was the first time the Supreme Court ever interpreted the Religion Clauses in the
First Amendment293—the Potter case explicitly stated that there is no strict scrutiny
for religious polygamists and that, even if there were, that the State has a compelling
interest to justify its continued criminalization.294 In order to make this analysis, the
Tenth Circuit would have to overrule itself in Potter, which is something I do not
think the Tenth Circuit would have done under the facts in the Brown case.
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2. Substantive Due Process Grounds
The Tenth Circuit could also ground its analysis in substantive Due Process.
Although the panel inquired into whether Windsor and Obergefell impacted the
cohabitation issue in the current polygamy case, the litigants were correct to focus
instead on Lawrence. The Lawrence case is more applicable here because, like the
statute in Lawrence, the statute attempts to criminalize private intimate associations,
one aspect, I argue, of the fundamental right at issue for polygamists in the current
decriminalization debate. 295 One argument used by those against Lawrence’s
application to polygamists is that the public aspects of informal polygamy—having
a “marriage ceremony” and holding each other out as “husband and wife”—take
polygamy outside of the scope of Lawrence, which only protects private consensual
adult relationships within the home.
A recurring theme throughout this litigation is the distinction made between
polygamy’s public conduct and its private conduct. While I agree with making the
distinction between the public and private aspects of polygamy, I do not agree that
this distinction means Lawrence no longer applies to informal polygamists. What
Lawrence does not apply to is the public behavior,296 but it does apply to protect the
intimate, private, marital relationships of adult, consenting polygamists.297 In other
words, Lawrence can and should apply to the private aspect of polygamy—the
cohabitation and “living together as husband and wife” part, that is still encapsulated
in the language of the “cohabitation” prong of the current statute. 298 Using this
approach, the court would have to apply heightened scrutiny under Lawrence to the
cohabitation prong of the statute. Again, without a showing of harm in this litigation,
the cohabitation prong would likely fail in the context of the Browns.
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3. Equal Protection Grounds
Another potential route that was not extensively explored in the Brown
litigation, but that has been addressed in the scholarship, is a possible Equal
Protection claim. Professors Hadar Aviram and Gwendolyn M. Leachman recently
argued that polyamorists could bring an equal protection claim in the context of
recognition of poly rights (not just the decriminalization), but these same equal
protection arguments can support a claim for decriminalization.299 As the authors
point out, polys can argue that polyamory is itself a “sexual orientation.”300 Recent
published studies tend to show that polyamorous behavior is a part of a person’s
identity and can be immutable. This research implies that polyamorists could have
a basis for recognition as a suspect class for purposes of equal protection of the
laws.301 Aviram and Leachman, however, admit the difficulty of this approach, as
the Supreme Court has not announced a new protected class since gender and
illegitimacy in the 1970s and has yet to define such a class for sexual orientation in
the context of homosexual rights, despite having numerous opportunities since the
1970s to do so.302
An argument on Equal Protection grounds would not likely work within the
confines of this case because it would fall prey to many of its recurring problems: it
was not litigated at the trial level and no evidence was introduced to support any
claim to a suspect class. Numerous things would have to occur before an Equal
Protection claim like this would be viable for decriminalizing polygamy. First, there
would have to be some sort of revival of defining suspect classes in the Supreme
Court,303 and that would likely require the Court to first address and protect sexual
orientation as it applies to homosexual behavior and rights first. Second, the studies
on our societal and scientific understandings of polygamy and polyamory would
299
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need to develop to a point of legitimacy. Using the model from same sex marriage
litigation, the science and social studies evidence would likely have to tend to show
that polyamory is a form of sexual orientation and at the core of a person’s
identity. 304 Considering the amount of resistance experienced by homosexuals to
establish sexual orientation’s immutability instead of being a “choice,”305 imagine
the resistance to any initial social or scientific study on the immutable nature of
polygamy in humans. Much would have to progress on both the legal, social, and
scientific tracts before an Equal Protection claim such as this could work for
polygamists.
4. Free Speech Grounds
The Cato Institute more extensively briefed the statute’s apparent restrictions
on Free Speech. This approach centers on the statute’s prohibition on “purporting to
marry” as it relates to the public aspects of informal polygamy—the “marriage”
ceremony and the holding each other out as “spouses.”306 As previously discussed,
the potential harm at the heart of informal polygamy is this public challenge or threat
to monogamous marriage. 307 The statute’s restriction on this type of conduct is
treated as a restriction on speech—conducting a ceremony and then telling people
or acting like a person is one’s “spouse.” Because of the restriction on the content
of the speech—in other words, a person is allowed to call someone a “mistress”
without violating the statute but not a “wife”—the statute must be narrowly tailored
to promote a compelling governmental interest. A content-based speech restriction
will fail strict scrutiny if the State cannot show a “direct causal link” between the
forbidden speech and the compelling government interest.308
While the Cato Institute framed the compelling interest in terms of preventing
marriage fraud and protecting women and children from sexual and physical abuse,
there still exists the “governmental interest” of promoting monogamous marriage
and the government’s control over public manifestations of marital relationships.309
But as previously addressed in Part II, neither interest is legitimate, much less
compelling. If the court were to use the Free Speech route to address the conduct,
this would allow the court the opportunity to again more squarely address what I
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perceive is the troublesome part of the statute—the “purports to marry” prong and
how that relates to the Browns in this case.
5. Hybrid Rights
One effect of a dismissal on jurisdictional grounds is that it avoids having to
address Buhman’s un-briefed hybrid rights grounds. 310 The panel could have
disregarded this omission because of counsel’s quick defense that two ill-formed
constitutional rights do not make up a hybrid rights claim.311 If the court were to
address the hybrid rights analysis, there are a few ways to structure it: 1) free
exercise + free speech; 2) free exercise + substantive due process; or even potentially
3) free exercise + free speech + substantive due process. Although the district court
opinion only addressed the possibility of a Free Exercise and substantive Due
Process hybrid claim, 312 the speech aspect of this formulation of a hybrid rights
theory brings in yet another ground for strict scrutiny that is stronger than
Lawrence’s heightened scrutiny privacy interest. The benefit of using the hybrid
rights theory is that it essentially bundles together, under the purview of Free
Exercise of Religion, a number of rights that, when taken together, become much
more difficult to “break apart” because of the automatic application of strict scrutiny
to hybrid rights claims.313
My hesitations with using such a hybrid rights claim stem from my previous
denigrations of using Free Exercise arguments in the context of multi-party marriage
rights, which should not be based on religious exceptionalism but on expansion of
liberty rights and society built on pluralism, self-identity, and choice. I also hesitate
to push for the use of hybrid rights because I, like previous scholars before me,
question the soundness of its genesis in Yoder v. Wisconsin.314 Although I find using
a combination of Free Exercise, Free Speech, and substantive Due Process a
fascinating expansion of the hybrid rights jurisprudence, I decline, for previous and
overall policy reasons, to endorse the hybrid rights theory in the context of
polygamy.
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6. A Combination of Substantive Due Process and Free Speech
In the context of informal polygamy, I am not sure that the Free Exercise
argument provides the plaintiffs much more than a combined substantive Due
Process and Free Speech argument. One thing the Tenth Circuit should have done,
had it been presented, is used Lawrence to analyze informal polygamy. As the
conduct in question involves both private behavior and public behavior, the court
should analyze the applicable parts of the statute under the applicable controlling
cases. The “cohabitation” prong would be invalid under Lawrence as an
impermissible infringement on the privacy interests that exist for consenting adults
within the home. The “purports to marry” prong addresses a couple’s outward
conduct and speech, such as a ceremony and holding each other out as spouses.315 It
would be invalid under Free Speech’s strict scrutiny test because the language of the
statute is not narrowly tailored to promote any compelling governmental interest
related to that speech.
IV. THE POLICY
With so many options from which to choose, it is imperative to pick the guiding
principles and policies to ground the debate moving forward. Since polygamy’s
national outlaw in the late 1800s, scholars have offered a smattering of overarching
principles they argue should control our treatment of polygamy: from historical
philosophical principles to morality and Western culture,316 to anti-discrimination
and the expansion of privacy after Lawrence,317 and of course, religious freedom.318
As previously mentioned throughout this Article, considering the dual private and
public aspects of polygamous conduct, my policy would be to favor the use of
substantive Due Process and Free Speech as part of the norm-shaping and
proscriptive function of the law in this arena.
I argue this position because, while Free Exercise of Religion does afford
polygamists with the highest level of scrutiny in terms of constitutional review, that
strict scrutiny comes at an impermissible cost.319 Further, with the addition of Free
Speech tenets, strict scrutiny can still be invoked, at least with respect to the public
aspects of polygamy.320 For utility purposes, the religion angle is less vital to success
than it once was. With respect to the private aspects of polygamy, those are governed
by Lawrence. While the Tenth Circuit may disagree, as the district court did, that
315

See State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726, 733 (Utah 2006) (discussing application of
“purports to marry”).
316
See Witte, Western Case, supra note 4, at 1677.
317
See Myers, supra note 32, at 1457; Askew, supra note 32, at 627–28.
318
See D. Marisa Black, Beyond Child Bride Polygamy: Polyamory, Unique Familial
Constructions, and the Law, 8 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 497, 500 (2006) (“[Polygamy’s] defenders
frequently cite religious convictions for such a practice.”); Davis, supra note 1, at 1969.
319
See Faucon, Polygamy After Windsor, supra note 2, at 522–26.
320
See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011).
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heightened scrutiny applies to the substantive Due Process rights of polygamists,321
arguments exist that the statute would not even pass rational basis as to these private
aspects as well.
This section presents a “mock” opinion of what the Tenth Circuit should have
done in an idealized procedural and factual trial court litigation. The section also
includes a suggestion as to permissible legislation in reaction to the “mock” Tenth
Circuit opinion that outlaws, essentially, only marriage license fraud or multiple
marriage licenses (although I have previously argued that the latter should be
legalized as well). The section ends with an explanation of the opinion and
justification for the policy choice to choose Due Process and Free Speech over
religion as the defining approach to decriminalizing polygamy.
A. Mock Opinion
The inspiration for the mock opinion to follow was inspired by Professor Adam
Lamparello’s response to the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent Obergefell v. Hodges
decision.322 Lamparello wrote a mock opinion as to how the Supreme Court should
have addressed the issues at stake in Obergefell, a Supreme Court case which applied
the rationale of Windsor to the states in holding bans against same sex marriage
unconstitutional.323 This pedagogical method was effective because, like with the
Brown case, the Windsor and Obergefell decisions caused confusion in the courts
and reactionary scholarship as to what fit test, if any, the Court used to strike down
same sex marriage bans.324 The Windsor and Obergefell opinions were also critiqued
for the vague way in which Justice Kennedy defined and measured the liberty
interest at stake, continuing to ignore the Court’s previously well-versed tiers
method.325 Similarly, the hope is that the mock opinion in this Article will guide
future approaches to the decriminalization issue and shed some legal clarity on the
applicable analysis.
Because this is a mock opinion, a few assumptions constrain and inform it.
First, the opinion omits a statement of background facts and procedural background.
Second, the opinion presumes that the factual question of polygamy’s harms, both
private and public, were properly argued and supported at the trial court level and
factually weighed in a manner consistent with the findings of Part II of this Article.
Second, the opinion borrows statements of facts and laws from prior related
321

Brown, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1202.
Adam Lamparello, Obergefell v. Hodges: How the Supreme Court Should Have
Decided the Case, 7 CONLAWNOW 27, 27 (2015).
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Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2585 (2015).
324
Lamparello, supra note 322 (quoting Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2630
n.22, 2616 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)) (“In Obergefell, et al. v.
Hodges, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion legalizing same-sex marriage was based on ‘the
mystical aphorisms of a fortune cookie,’ and ‘indefensible as a matter of constitutional
law.’”).
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Id.
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published opinions in the case, namely Brown v. Hebert,326 as well as from briefs for
both appellant and appellees, 327 and from amici curiae, 328 where appropriate, to
support the substantive analysis. I adopt similar persuasive language from appeals
briefs as a nod to my agreement with and endorsement of them. I further
acknowledge instances in which I have taken arguments and language from litigant
and amicus briefing in footnotes which would otherwise not appear in a judicial
opinion. Other areas in which the mock opinion diverges from those proffered
already in the Brown litigation are entirely my own.

Plaintiffs/Appellees in this case brought suit in Utah federal district court
challenging the constitutionality of Utah’s Anti-Bigamy criminal statute, Utah Code
Ann. § 76-7-101. On summary judgment, the Utah district court found that the
“cohabitation” prong of the Utah Anti-Bigamy statute violated both the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. See Brown v. Buhman, 947 F.
Supp. 2d 1170, 1204–21, 1222–26 (D. Utah 2013). Defendant Buhman appealed.
Upon review, we affirm in part, and reverse in part.
I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Osborne v. Baxter
Healthcare Corp., 798 F.3d 1260, 1266 (10th Cir. 2015). “The court shall grant
summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a).
II.

DISCUSSION

We affirm the district court’s decision to grant Plaintiffs’ motion for summary
judgment on the grounds that the statute as applied to the Browns is unconstitutional
in violation of their Free Speech rights under the First Amendment and their Due
Process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. We reverse the portion of the
district court’s decision that interprets the Utah Anti-Bigamy statute in a manner that
differs from the Utah Supreme Court interpretations of the “purports to marry”
portion and the “cohabitation” portion of the statute.
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850 F. Supp. 2d 1240, 1244 (D. Utah 2012).
Brief of Appellees, supra note 165, at 26–27.
328
Brief of the Cato Inst., supra note 7.
327
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Interpretation of Utah’s Anti-Bigamy Statute

Appellant argues that the district court erred when it ignored Utah state cases
interpreting the language of Utah’s Anti-Bigamy Statute. The relevant part of the
statute in question reads:
(1) A person is guilty of bigamy when, knowing he has a husband or wife
or knowing the other person has a husband or wife, the person purports
to marry another person or cohabits with another person.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-101. In interpreting this statute, the district court held that
“purports to marry” is limited to attempts at legal marriage and does not include
informal “marriage” ceremonies that have no legal significance. Appellant argues
that the district court erred when it interpreted “purports to marry” and
“cohabitation” in a manner that differs from interpretations by the Utah Supreme
Court. We agree.
In State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726 (Utah 2006), the Utah Supreme Court held that
the term “marry” in the “purports to marry” part of the statute is not limited to
lawfully recognized marriages: “[T]he term ‘marry’ is not confined to legally
recognized marriages . . . [and] one need not purport that a second marriage is
entitled to legal recognition to run afoul of the ‘purports to marry’ prong of the
bigamy statute.” Id. at 736. In Holm, Plaintiff Rodney Holm was lawfully married
to Suzi Stubbs, after which he married Wendy Holm and Ruth Stubbs in two separate
religious ceremonies. Id. at 730. At trial, Ruth Stubbs testified that she believed that
she was married to Mr. Holm even though she was aware that the marriage was not
lawful. She testified that she wore white dress, which she considered a wedding
dress; that she and Mr. Holm exchanged vows; and that a religious leader of their
church conducted the ceremony. See id. The State also introduced evidence that Mr.
Holm and Ruth Stubbs considered themselves husband and wife and frequently had
sexual intercourse.
Mr. Holm petitioned the court for dismissal on the ground that the “purports to
marry” prong only applied to legally recognized marriages. The Utah Supreme Court
disagreed, and held that the term “marry” includes both legal marriages and others
not authorized by the State. Id. at 733. Looking to the legislative history and purpose
of the statute, the court determined that the Utah legislature anticipated the
possibility of an unlawful marriage or unlawful marital relationship when it drafted
the statute. The Green court explained that the lower court correctly “allowed an
unsolemnized marriage to serve as a predicate marriage for purposes of a bigamy
prosecution.” Id. at 736 (citing State v. Green, 99 P.3d 820, 823 (Utah 2004)). The
court stressed that the statute “does not require a party to enter into a second marriage
(however defined) to run afoul of the statute; cohabitation alone would constitute
bigamy pursuant to the statute’s terms.” Holm, 137 P.3d at 735. The court ultimately
held that Mr. Holm violated both the “purports to marry” and the “cohabitation”
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portions when he engaged in a marriage ceremony and lived together as husband
and wife with Ruth Stubbs.
In State v. Green, the Utah Supreme Court held that the “cohabitation” prong
of the Utah Anti-Bigamy statute does not target religious polygamists and that it is
facially neutral and neutral in operation. 99 P.3d at 828. In Green, Mr. Thomas
Green was an avowed polygamist with nine wives and twenty-five children who
appeared on multiple TV shows with his wives. Id. at 822–23. In 2000, Utah charged
Mr. Green with four counts of bigamy, alleging he violated the statute when he
cohabitated with five other women while he was legally married to Linda Kunz. Id.
at 823. Mr. Green and his wives resided in a collection of mobile homes, which they
called “Green Haven.” Mr. Green lived in his own mobile home, and his wives took
turns spending nights with him on a rotating schedule. Id. at 822–23.
To convict Mr. Green, the State had to bring a motion under the Unsolemnized
Marriage Statute, which allows a court to find a legal marriage in the absence of
solemnization. Green, 99 P.3d at 823 (citing Whyte v. Blair, 885 P.2d 791, 793 (Utah
1994)). An unsolemnized marriage becomes valid and legal in Utah if it is
established that a marriage has “emerged between a woman and a man who are
capable of giving consent, are of legal age, and are legally able to enter into a
solemnized marriage under Utah law, have cohabited, have mutually undertaken
marriage duties, obligations, and rights, and created a reputation with the public as
husband and wife.” UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-4.5. Based on these facts, the court
found Mr. Green guilty of four counts of bigamy.
Mr. Green also argued on appeal that the statute’s use of the word “cohabit”
targeted religiously motivated bigamous practices because the previous laws made
in reaction to polygamy had used “cohabitation” as a factor in prosecuting
polygamy. Thus, the “cohabitation” provision is actually aimed at religiously
motivated polygamy. The Green court disagreed and held that the statute was
facially neutral and that the word “cohabit” did not have a genesis in religious
meaning or association. Counsel for the Browns argue that the district court did not
err in ignoring the Utah Supreme Court’s interpretation of “purports to marry” and
using a narrower interpretation of “marry,” which is limited to attempts at legal
marriage. We disagree. While this Court is not bound by a state court’s interpretation
of federal constitutional guarantees, United States v. Madden, 682 F.3d 920, 927
(10th Cir. 2012), we are bound by the Utah Supreme Court’s interpretations of the
“purports to marry” prong and the “cohabitation” prong in the statute. “[I]t is not
within our power to construe and narrow state laws.” Grayned v. City of Rockford,
408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972). “Federal courts do not sit as a super state legislature, [and]
may not impose [their] own narrowing construction . . . if the state courts have not
already done so.” United Food & Commercial Workers Intern. Union, AFL-CIO,
CLC v. IBP, Inc., 857 F.2d 422, 431 (8th Cir. 1988) (alterations in original).
We must now determine whether the Plaintiffs’ conduct is prohibited under
either or both the “purport to marry” prong and the “cohabitation” prong of the
statute. The Brown family does not have multiple marriage licenses. There is only
one recorded marriage license in the Brown family—that of Kody and Meri Brown.
It is also undisputed that the Brown family publicly acknowledges their lifestyles as
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a polygamous family in both their TV show and their public speaking engagements.
Kody refers to each of his wives as his “spiritual wives.” Testimony exists that Kody
engaged in a religious ceremony with each of his spiritual wives. Season One of
their TV show ended with Kody’s engaging in a ceremony with Robyn, in which
Robyn wore a white dress, the couple exchanged vows, and Meri, Janelle, and
Christine welcomed Robyn into the family by presenting her with a ring. Under
Holm’s interpretation of “purports to marry,” which is not limited to only multiple
legal marriages, but also includes non-legal religious marriage ceremonies and
otherwise acting as spouses, we find that the “purports to marry” portion of the
statute applies to the public aspects of the Brown’s polygamous marriage as stated
above.
The Browns also violate the “cohabitation” prong of the statute because Kody
Brown engages in private, marital-like relationships and lives as a spouse with all of
his wives in a domestic setting. When the family still lived in Lehi and before Robyn
married into the family, the Browns lived in a ranch-style home with three
interconnected apartments, sharing a common curtilage. In Season Two, the family
looked for real estate in Las Vegas in which the entire family could live in a single
home or in which they could occupy four houses in a cul-de-sac. Under the plain
language of the “cohabitation” prong of the statute as well as Green’s interpretation
that “cohabitation” is not restricted to religious polygamists on its face, we find that
the “cohabitation” portion of the statute applies to the private aspects of the Browns’
polygamous marriage as stated above.
We hold that the district court erred when it narrowed the “purports to marry”
section of the statute to include only attempts at multiple legal marriages and erred
when it found that the “purports to marry” section did not apply to the Browns.
B.

Constitutional Challenges to Utah’s Anti-Bigamy Statute

Appellee Browns allege that both the “purports to marry” provision and the
“cohabitation” provision are unconstitutional as applied to the Browns. Specifically,
the Browns allege that the “purports to marry” provision violates their Free Speech
under the First Amendment and that the “cohabitation” provision violates their Due
Process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. We agree.
1.

Free Speech

Although we are bound by state interpretations of the Anti-Bigamy statute, we
are not bound by state interpretations of federal constitutional questions. Madden,
682 F.3d at 927. The Browns allege that the “purports to marry” provision violates
their Free Speech rights under the First Amendment. Utah defines criminal bigamy
to include saying “I do” in a wedding ceremony, or saying “that’s my wife” about a
person one lives with, even when everyone knows that the marriage is not legally
recognized. The Utah Supreme Court stated in Holm that the restriction on “purports
to marry” more than one person applies even when one is not “claiming any legal
recognition of the marital relationships.” State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726, 736 (Utah
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2006). The Holm court found that “religious solemnization,” which requires nothing
but speech and expressive conduct, violates the statute. Id. at 732.
As applied to the Brown family, the restrictions against “purport[ing] to marry”
more than one spouse at a time violates their First Amendment rights to Free Speech
by criminalizing not only their public marriage ceremonies in which the couple
expresses their commitment to each other as spouses, but also their public TV show
and their public appearances in which they discuss their polygamist lifestyle and
beliefs. “Such statements, which are aimed at legal and social change, are at the core
of First Amendment protections.” National Gay Task Force v. Bd. of Educ. of
Oklahoma City, 729 F.2d 1270, 1274 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding a statute
unconstitutional that restricted school teachers from hypothetically appearing on TV
or advocating before the Oklahoma legislature with respect to a ban against school
teachers advocating, encouraging, or promoting homosexual activity).
With respect to their public marriage ceremonies, the message-conveying
nature of the ceremony is present even if the expression is nonpolitical. Axson-Flynn
v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1284 n.4 (10th Cir. 2004) (“First Amendment protection
does not hinge on the ideological nature of the speech involved.”). Here, the statute
restricts speech because of the contents of the speech. See Grace United Methodist
Church v. City of Cheyenne, 451 F.3d 643, 657 (10th Cir. 2006) (“Content-based
restrictions on speech [are] those which suppress, disadvantage, or impose
differential burdens upon speech because of its content . . . .”). Just as wearing black
armbands to protest the Vietnam War, Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist.,
393 U.S. 503, 505–06 (1969), burning an American flag, Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S.
397, 404–05 (1989), and holding a St. Patrick’s Day parade, Hurley v. IrishAmerican Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 568–70 (1995),
are all considered speech under the First Amendment because of the message they
convey, so too is a marriage ceremony. Such a ceremony is “inherently expressive,”
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, 547 U.S. 47, 66 (2006),
because the parties have an “intent to convey a particularized message” by the
ceremony—the message that they want to treat each other as spouses—and “the
likelihood [is] great that the message would be understood by those who viewed it.”
Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404.329
We find that the “purports to marry” portion of the Utah Anti-Bigamy statute
restricts speech—namely, the public aspects of polygamy. In the case of the Browns,
this includes airing their reality TV show, making public appearances and speaking
about their poly lifestyles, engaging in non-legal marriage ceremonies, and
otherwise holding its family members out as spouses.
We also find that the restriction does not fall into any exception. Although
fraudulent speech is constitutionally unprotected, the bigamy statute is not limited
to fraud and bars a broad range of speech just because some instances of speech may
be fraudulent. See Riley v. Nat’l Fed. of Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 798–99
(1988). In fact, the district court’s limiting the statute to criminalize only marriage
fraud would fit into this exception. Nor can this court seriously construe the statute
329
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2016]

DECRIMINALIZING POLYGAMY

767

as an attempt to prevent conspiracies to engage in criminal conduct. See, e.g., United
States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 298 (2008); United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460,
468–69 (2010).
As a restriction on speech, the “purports to marry” portion of the Utah AntiBigamy statute is unconstitutional unless the government can show that the statute
is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. See Brown v. Entm’t
Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011). A content-based speech restriction
fails strict scrutiny if the government cannot show a “direct causal link” between the
forbidden speech and the compelling government interest. Id. at 2738.
Appellant alleges that the compelling government interest relating to the
“purports to marry” restriction on speech is to uphold ordered liberty based on
monogamy. Appellant argues that the government submitted both expert testimony
and social science reports documenting these public harms at the trial court level. In
response, Plaintiffs submitted arguments discrediting the soundness of these
arguments, to which we now thinkweigh against a finding of material fact that would
preclude summary judgment. We further find that the government interest submitted
is not compelling. The Court has made clear that the government has no power to
demand “that a symbol be used to express only one view of that symbol or its
referents.” Johnson, 491 U.S. at 417. The statute aims to prevent one of the very
things most protected at the core of the First Amendment—speech and conduct that
challenges or critiques political and social injustices or norms, in this case, the
symbolism involved for the word “marriage” and that involved in wedding
ceremonies and public proclamations of marriage. We find that the Anti-Bigamy
statute’s “purports to marry” provision is unconstitutional as applied to the Browns
in violation of their Free Speech guarantees in the First Amendment.
2.

Substantive Due Process

The district court held that the “cohabitation” provision of the statute, as applied
to the Browns, violated their Due Process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Appellant argues that the district court erred when it found that even if heightened
scrutiny did not apply the “cohabitation” provision would still fail rational basis
scrutiny. The Brown family also argues that the district court erred when it found
that heightened scrutiny under Lawrence v. Texas does not apply to the
“cohabitation” prong of the statute. For reasons stated below, we agree with
Appellee Browns that the district court should have used Lawrence’s heightened
scrutiny, and affirm the district court’s finding that the “cohabitation” prong would
still fail rational basis scrutiny. The Browns argue that the “cohabitation” prong
violates their substantive Due Process rights under heightened scrutiny set out in
Lawrence. To state a claim for substantive Due Process, the plaintiff must show (1)
an asserted “fundamental right” or “fundamental liberty” that is “deeply rooted in
this Nation’s history and tradition and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such
that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed” and (2) a “careful
description of the asserted fundamental liberty interest.” Washington v. Glucksberg,
521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997); Seegmiller v. Laverkin City, 528 F.3d 762, 769 (10th Cir.
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2008). The district court found that, while the Browns’ asserted a careful description
of the liberty interest at stake, that the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Seegmiller required
a finding that heightened scrutiny was inapplicable to the Browns’ “cohabitation”
claim. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1201.
We find that the district court erred in its reliance on Seegmiller because
Seegmiller is distinguishable from the instant case. Seegmiller involved a female
police officer who was reprimanded by her department for having extra-marital
sexual relations with an officer from another department while on a department trip.
528 F.3d at 765. We held that the police officer did not have a fundamental liberty
interest in engaging in private act of consensual sex to support a heightened scrutiny
claim under Lawrence. Id. at 772. We further held that the department properly
reprimanded the officer based on its office code of ethics, which precluded a finding
that the statute violated rational basis review. Id. The Seegmiller case is
distinguishable because the fundamental liberty interest at stake in that case involved
adulterous sexual relations, whereas the fundamental liberty interest at stake for the
Browns (and proscribed by the statute) is polygamous cohabitation, which involves
much more than just sexual intimacy but also a choice to live domestically and in
private as a poly family.
Appellees argue on appeal that the district court should have applied heightened
scrutiny to the “cohabitation” statute under Lawrence. In Lawrence, the Court found
a fundamental liberty interest in the “right [of] homosexuals to engage in sodomy.”
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 566–67. The Court found that liberty required protecting
private sexual conduct:
Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government intrusions
into a dwelling or other private places. In our tradition the State is not
omnipresent in the home. And there are other spheres of our lives and
existence, outside the home, where the State should not be a dominant
presence. Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds. Liberty presumes an
autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and
certain intimate conduct.
Id. at 562. In Lawrence, the Court rejected a general claim of harm to justify the
criminalization of “the most private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most
private of places, the home.” Id. at 567. The Court further amplified this fundamental
right in Windsor and again in the opening line of Obergefell: “The Constitution
promises liberty to all within its reach, a liberty that includes certain specific rights
that allow persons, within a lawful realm, to define and express their identity.”
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2593. It is the same right first described in Lawrence that
“adults may choose to enter upon this relationship in the confines of their homes and
their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons.” Lawrence, 539
U.S. at 567. We find that the Browns have identified a fundamental right subject to
heightened scrutiny under Lawrence.
As applied to the Browns, the law criminalizes their individual choices to
organize their families and romantic relationships as a poly family. It further
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criminalizes the mere act of cohabitation of these close, intimate adults, even in the
absence of a religious ceremony or other public acknowledgements of marriage, by
directly and impermissibly interfering with their domestic living arrangements.
Thus, either facially or as applied, the cohabitation provision violates the Browns’
fundamental Due Process interests.330 Pursuant to Lawrence’s heightened scrutiny
standard, we find that the “cohabitation” provision fails this heightened standard of
review.
Appellant alleges that the district court erred in finding that no evidence of
material fact exists with respect to harms caused by polygamous cohabitation. We
disagree. On summary judgment, Defendant Buhman introduced expert and
personal testimony that polygamous cohabitation is often affiliated with abuses to
women and children. The Browns in response submitted both expert and personal
testimony to support a finding that these ancillary abuses are not caused by
polygamous cohabitation itself, but by isolationism, criminalization, and extreme
misogynist beliefs. Based upon this evidence, we find that the “cohabitation”
provision is not narrowly tailored to support these government interests. Such harm
cannot be assumed any more than it can be for monogamous relationships or
monogamous cohabitation in society. Any harm like child abuse or fraud can occur
as readily in non-polygamous relationships and are, more importantly, already
regulated by narrowly tailored criminal laws. We further affirm the district court’s
finding that even if heightened scrutiny does not apply, the “cohabitation” provision
as applied to the Browns cannot pass rational basis scrutiny.
The Supreme Court has recently admonished that rational basis review is “not
a toothless” inquiry. See Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510 (1976). In a similar
case to the present, in U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973), the
federal government claimed a rational basis of combatting fraud, as is the case here,
with a provision that made households ineligible for food stamps if they contained
a member who was not related to other members of the household. The Court struck
down the law under a rational basis analysis and specifically rejected the argument
that certain types of households were more likely to commit fraud, as is the case
here. Much like criminalizing all cohabitation by citing a few extreme cases of
polygamists, the Court noted that the government could not satisfy a rational basis
test with such loose association or extrapolation.
Appellant argues that the State has a legitimate interest in outlawing
polygamous cohabitation because it often uses, as is consistent with Tenth Circuit
precedent to do, the polygamy statute in order to open an investigation into other
more heinous crimes that might be present, such as child abuse or underage
marriage. Appellant argues that this is a rational basis because evidence of these
ancillary crimes are often difficult to obtain in such close-knit communities who
often fear law enforcement. However, we find that using the “cohabitation”
provision of the statute as a tool to “fish” for evidence of other crimes cannot support
a rational basis. To allow such a use of the statute would be the equivalent of
criminalizing homosexual conduct in order to potentially find evidence of child
330
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abuse or pedophilia—a basis hardly rational or even thinkable when put in those
terms.
The Supreme Court has also found that rational basis does not exist if the
restrictions are based on animus or moral disapproval. The Supreme Court struck
down the law in Lawrence in part because such claims are often thinly veiled
examples of moralistic disapproval of non-traditional and alternative relationships
and lifestyles. In United States v. Windsor, the Supreme Court held that the federal
Defense of Marriage Act was invalid because its legislative intent and effect was “to
disparage and to injure those whom the State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect
in personhood and dignity.” 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013). Lawrence stands for the
protection of the right to choose one’s lifestyle and intimate relations. It stressed that
such liberty interests necessarily mean that outdated notions of societal harms are
invalid in a multi-cultural and plural society.331
We find no rational basis exists to criminalize polygamous cohabitation as
opposed to monogamous cohabitation or other forms of cohabitation where one
person is not legally married to someone else. As we previously discussed, the harms
ancillary to polygamous cohabitation are already subject to more exacting criminal
laws that govern child abuse, spousal abuse, and fraud in all families, polygamous
or monogamous. We affirm the district court’s decision that found the
“cohabitation” provision of the statute cannot pass rational basis scrutiny.
We affirm the district court’s decision to grant Plaintiffs’ motion for summary
judgment on the grounds that the statute as applied to the Browns is unconstitutional
in violation of their Free Speech rights under the First Amendment and their Due
Process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. We reverse the portion of the
district court’s decision that interprets the Utah Anti-Bigamy statute in a manner that
differs from the Utah Supreme Court interpretations of the “purports to marry”
portion and the “cohabitation” portion of the statute.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART.

B. Model Legislation
Although it is unclear at this point whether the poly equality movement will
track the progression of the same-sex marriage equality movement, the locus of legal
movement could occur in the legislatures. Indeed, after the Utah district court’s
decision, at least two bills were introduced in the house in an attempt to re-write the
anti-bigamy statute to support that particular sponsor’s view following the Brown
decision.332 In aid of that endeavor, I have included sample legislation which would
331
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follow a case in which informal polygamy is no longer outlawed. The model statute
would, however, still ban formal polygamy or marriage fraud.
The work done by the more recent Utah House Bill 281, which places an “and”
between the “purports to marry” and the “cohabitation” prongs,333 at least attempts
to more clearly delineate adulterous cohabitation from polygamous cohabitation in
requiring both “purporting to marry” and “cohabitation” to trigger the statute. While
it fixes the vagueness problem, it still does not address the substantive problems in
criminalizing both the public and private aspects of polygamy. In an attempt to
mirror the holding in the mock opinion, the following is just one example of a way
to re-write the polygamy bans to delineate prohibited conduct from acceptable
conduct:
(1) A person is guilty of bigamy when, knowing he or she has a husband
or wife, or knowing the other person has a husband or wife, the person
attempts to legally marry the other person.
(2) Bigamy is a felony of the third degree.
(3) It shall be a defense to bigamy that the accused reasonably believed
he or she and the other person were legally eligible to remarry.
When measured against the acceptable legal foundation, the only acceptable
constraint is to protect against marriage license fraud or legal polygamy, the exact
conduct Judge Waddoups’ decision left intact in the statute after his judicial refashioning of the statute.334 Although balked at by scholars following his decision,
his end result does not seem so off course now.
C. The Hope for the Future
This Article is meant to be forward-looking, but not so placed in the future to
be of no moment now. Poly reform is happening, much faster than imagined,
following on the heels of the same-sex marriage equality movement. And I do
believe that courts and legislatures will have to soon wrestle with whether
criminalizing polygamy can pass constitutional muster.335 But in our haste to ride
the equality wave, we have to make sure we are approaching this grounded in a
policy best suited for the future, and not just what will get us there the fastest. This
subsection outlines why the hope is that polygamy laws will be found
unconstitutional under substantive Due Process and Free Speech grounds and not
Free Exercise of Religion grounds with respect to the strength and long-term effects
of the legal arguments and the norm-shaping function of the law.
333
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1. Grounding Arguments in Free Speech and Due Process
The policy choice made in the “mock” opinion applies tenets of Free Speech to
the public aspects of polygamy and tenets sounding in substantive Due Process to
the private aspects of polygamy. While neither body of law is foreign to the
polygamy debate, the Free Speech ground is relatively novel, and no one has yet to
bifurcate the analysis and application of Free Speech and substantive Due Process
in this way.
In its amicus brief to the Tenth Circuit, submitted by Ilya Shapiro and Eugene
Volokh on behalf of the CATO Institute and which influenced a large portion of the
“mock” opinion, amicus argued explicitly that the Utah Anti-Bigamy statute
impermissibly criminalizes speech.336 The CATO Institute approach differs from the
approach used in the “mock” opinion in that it applied Free Speech jurisprudence to
both the public, symbolic aspects of polygamy as well as to the private, cohabitation
aspects.337 This legal application of Free Speech laws is grounded in the finding that
cohabitation normally results only after a public, ceremonial marriage, and that such
“conduct-plus-speech” restrictions are treated as restrictions on speech.338 In this
situation, this reading would be even more convincing if the underlying statute in
question read both “purports to marry” and the “cohabitation” provisions together,
but as it stands, one can violate the statute by one’s engaging in either the public
aspects or the private aspects of polygamous behavior.339
Instead, the “mock” opinion first argues that Free Speech laws apply to the
public conduct at issue. In the case of the Browns, this includes their nationally
televised reality show as well as their public appearances. This also includes, as for
many practicing polygamists, a ceremonial element and other objective conduct
tending to show that Kody regards Meri, Janelle, Christine, and Robyn as his wives.
Even with polys who are not “public figures” in the manner that the Brown family
is or who do not speak out publicly to foster understanding and acceptance of poly
families, but who only engage in the marriage ceremony or publicly hold themselves
out as married spouses, the “mock” opinion and the bifurcation of the applicable
substantive law applies equally to them.
The “mock” opinion applies the Lawrence rationale to the “cohabitation”
provision of the statute in order to find that it violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process guarantees. Although some would argue that Lawrence cannot and
should not be interpreted to extend to and apply to polygamists, 340 I argue that
336
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Lawrence’s articulation of the fundamental right, coupled with the further gloss
provided to the Lawrence decision in recent cases such as Windsor and Obergefell,
captures the fundamentally protected liberty interest at the heart of polygamous
cohabitation. In that regard, the “mock” opinion consciously chooses to support the
substantive Due Process claim using the more strict, heightened scrutiny standard
used in Lawrence without having to necessarily rely on the “backup” of doing a
rational basis analysis. However, I do think the “cohabitation” provision, even when
read in the conjunctive in order to limit the criminalized conduct to polygamous
cohabitation, would still fail rational basis scrutiny.
Leaving somewhat of a gap in the decision actually puts the Lawrence analysis
more in line with the Supreme Court’s overall shift toward focusing less on stringent
fit tests in the realm of substantive Due Process, fundamental rights cases and more
toward reasonableness and animus in general.341 If that prediction is correct, but with
more strict confines than is often proffered by Justice Kennedy in the recent samesex marriage cases,342 then restrictions on poly behavior will be found unreasonable
and based on animus in the same manner that sodomy laws were enforced against
gays. 343 Further, decriminalizing polygamy is not a marriage case, and I am not
implying to rely on Windsor or Obergefell in this instance. But what I am saying is
that looking at how Lawrence is likely to be interpreted after the addition of Windsor
and Obergefell, Lawrence’s “stealth constitutionalism” captures the fundamental
right at issue for poly families today.344 In somewhat of an ironic turn on the late
Justice Antonin Scalia’s dissent in Lawrence, in which he argues that
decriminalizing sodomy will lead down a slippery slope toward polygamy, it appears
that Lawrence does just as he predicted. 345 In the context of polygamous
cohabitation, Lawrence provides some heightened level of scrutiny around private
sexual acts within the privacy of one’s home and between consenting adults that,
while difficult to determine its contours in subsequent cases, the heightened nature
of the inquiry becomes less important than does its applicability to certain conduct.
2. Promoting “Intimacy Pluralism” Over Religion
Noticeably absent from the mock opinion is any inquiry into whether the statute
targets religious polygamists in practice and does not address any arguments or
distinctions based on the Browns’ religious beliefs in polygamy. As stated
341
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throughout this Article, this omission is conscious and deliberate after years of
careful study of polygamy in the United States. While there are some social and
political benefits to including religion as a feature of the poly debate, its inclusion
comes at too high a cost in the theoretical long-run. Instead, we should promote laws
that decriminalize polygamy based on tenets of diversity, liberty, and choice in
intimate family relationships.
Objectively, arguments grounded in religion may represent the strongest legal
route to decriminalizing polygamy, as religious freedom is afforded great reverence
in the Supreme Court jurisprudence. 346 As my previous research has shown, for
many polygamists, their religious beliefs are the most important feature of their
lives, and ignoring the religious nature in the legal analysis could also devalue the
liberty interests of those polygamists who practice for not just social or cultural
reasons.347 Deciding to include Free Exercise of Religion as a grounds to challenge
polygamy bans also provides a strict level of constitutional scrutiny.
But with the advantage of strict scrutiny comes unintended and impermissible
consequences. The first obvious problem is that this choice would make a distinction
between those who practice polygamy for religious reasons versus those who engage
in poly behavior for non-religious reasons. Treating those who practice polygamy
for secular reasons disparately than those who practice it for religious ones could
lead to even more claims of substantive Due Process and Equal Protection violations.
As a result of the disparate treatment, this could lead to practicing polys feigning
religious adherence to achieve equal status as religious polys.
On a deeper level, including religious exception as a basis to decriminalize
polygamy only re-introduces and intertwines religious influence and control into the
marriage arena. This religious intertwining, while practiced and accepted by many
mainstream Americans, can potentially become more pernicious toward women
when practiced at its extremes. Some recent scholars have argued that extremist
religious beliefs, such as those practiced by fundamentalist Mormons and Muslims,
are inherently misogynist and harmful to women.348 While I decline to take a hard
stance on those arguments, especially in the context of religious polygamy, I find
the arguments compelling and think it raises some interesting questions. If that is the
case, then validating religious beliefs that may support both polygamy and, in some
extreme cases, the elevation of men over the status of women to the point of abuse,
would be an unwise policy move.
Considering the United States’ long history with Mormon polygamists and our
more recent dealings with Muslim polygamists, 349 which pits minority religious
346
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beliefs against mainstream religious beliefs that control the majority and translate
into laws,350 the religion argument may cause more damage to the poly movement’s
acceptance than good. While the United States is a religious country compared to
other First World, Western countries, it is still very particular about which religions
and which religious beliefs are valued as acceptable to influence the mainstream.351
I find that this adherence has led to the use of religion to create dissention and to
suppress where any conduct is at issue that might implicate our moral compass in
the context of expanding civil rights. Because of this historical tension which is
inescapable at this point in clouding our dealings with polygamy, it is best to remove
the polygamy debate from within that framework and instead promote its acceptance
through tenets of Free Speech and Due Process ideals of equality, identity, and
choice.
Focusing instead on substantive Due Process or “intimacy pluralism” as this
paper has previously described it, allows us to decriminalize polygamy by
recognizing and upholding the plurality of intimate associations as equal to one
another when based on the conscious choice and identity of consenting adults.352
The Supreme Court recently affirmed in Windsor and again in Obergefell the policy
to value consenting adult same-sex relationships on similar “equal dignity”
grounds. 353 To refuse that same equal dignity to the lifestyles and intimate
associations of polys is an offense to ideals of equality, liberty, and justice. These
ideals frame a larger push toward decriminalization and acceptance of alternative
marital structures and the privatization and contractualization of marital and family
obligations. In that regard, we do not “need” Free Exercise of Religion to get us to
the ultimate goal of “intimacy pluralism” as religious polygamy would likely be
subsumed within that framework as well.
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Plus, adding a Free Speech element brings strict scrutiny back into the fold.354
In that sense, we do not lose much in terms of the legal arsenal by dropping Free
Exercise of Religion and adding Free Speech. While novel, the Free Speech angle is
less controversial and more likely to garner agreement instead of debate. Even the
most conservative of judges on the Court, who would find polygamous behavior
abhorrent to morality and an absurd expansion of the Fourteenth Amendment,
uphold Free Speech rights as sacrosanct in a country where freedom of the press and
information is at the cornerstone of maintaining checks on the government and
suppressive laws.355
V. CONCLUSION
Although the Tenth Circuit’s reversal on mootness grounds reaffirmed the
outlawed status of informal polygamy, the Brown case did spark a resurgence in the
poly decriminalization debate.356 Once unthinkable, following on the heels of the
marriage equality movement and expansion of “intimacy pluralism,” we are on the
brink of decriminalizing polygamy. While I welcome the end of the criminal
sanctions and resulting stigma against poly relationships and the expression of
fundamental rights, we must ensure that in our haste we do not sacrifice our
principles of liberty and identity in exchange for the fast-track.
To aid in this pursuit and to inform future arguments in the decriminalization
debate, this Article sets out a three-step gloss that focuses on the three main inquiries
involved in decriminalizing polygamy—the alleged harms of polygamy; the
substantive law at the center of the constitutional questions, as well as the precise
statutory language required to delineate permissible conduct from impermissible
conduct; and the overarching political and social ideologies that should guide our
approach to the issue.
The Harm. Applying this gloss over the Brown litigation allows us to finally
crystallize the harmful conduct that relates to the private aspects of polygamy as well
as the public aspects of polygamy. This exercise allows us to see that the harms
attendant to the public aspects focus on threatening the State’s control over marriage
and usurping the marriage ceremony as a literal status symbol conferred only by the
alleged benevolent power of the State. This analysis also deduces that the individual
or private harms allegedly attendant to polygamous cohabitation are unsupportable
as a justification to outlaw informal polygamy.
The Law. Both findings of harm, however, are impermissibly regulated by the
Utah Anti-Bigamy statute. With all of the competing constitutional clamor following
the Utah district court’s decision striking down the cohabitation prong on no less
354
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than four arguably merited constitutional grounds,357 this gloss allows an inquiry
into the soundness and applicability of each potential constitutional protection
against the harms identified in step one as being at the heart of private and public
aspects of polygamy. Inherent in this inquiry is an initial investigation into policy
grounds.
The Brown litigation and its impetus in the Utah House further demonstrates
the need for the law to proscribe precisely the prohibited conduct from permissible
conduct. The confusion resulting from different interpretations of the statute over
the years, as well as its reactionary legislative gerrymandering, have yet to clarify
the standard.358 Although the recent House Bill 281 does improve in that regard in
distinguishing between polygamous cohabitation and clandestine and adulterous
cohabitation, by requiring both “purports to marry” and “cohabitation” to violate the
statute,359 that revision and proscription against polygamous cohabitation are still
subject to the same constitutional attacks as set forth in this Article. In fact, reading
the provisions together even bolsters the Free Speech argument, as asserted by the
Cato Institute in its amicus brief to the Tenth Circuit.360
The Policy. To guide the direction of the constitutional avenues toward
decriminalizing polygamy, especially with so many competing voices, this
framework requires an inquiry into which overarching policy should prevail. In the
case of decriminalizing polygamy, the Brown litigation’s overall policies were based
on Free Exercise of Religion and substantive Due Process.361 But considering the
harms alleged, this Article sets forth as an alternative which is based on tenets of
substantive Due Process and Free Speech. In that regard, this Article is the first to
argue that the restrictions on the public aspects of poly behavior are unconstitutional
under Free Speech laws and that the private, cohabitation aspects of poly behavior
are unconstitutional in violation of Lawrence’s Due Process findings.362
This approach consciously ignores arguments grounded in Free Exercise of
Religion. Going into battle under the banner of Free Exercise may win poly
proponents a swift victory, but this allegiance would cause nothing but dissension in
the ranks and potential regression in the march toward equality.363 Grounding the
argument instead on “intimacy pluralism” as set forth in Lawrence’s substantive Due
Process allows us to include the widest range of poly conduct and uphold diversity
in marital relationships by striving for individual choice, identity, and diversity in
intimacy within the private sphere.364 Free Speech laws allow us to protect the public
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manifestations of these intimate relationships and the symbolic representations that
public manifestations convey.365
The hope is that this Article and the mock opinion within it will guide the future
decriminalization of polygamy. Although not without its limitations, this approach
attempts to learn from the collective past two millennia of judicial and legislative
dealings with polygamy in order to predict the proper regulation of poly behavior in
the no longer distant future. Once thought completely absurd and as a last stop on
the slippery slope toward pedophilia and bestiality, 366 the Brown case has also
revealed that under more favorable facts and circumstances, a poly family may soon
successfully challenge criminal sanctions against polygamy in a manner that
resonates within society and creates permanent change in the legal understanding
and regulation of multi-party relationships. We need to make sure that in our quest
toward progress, we set ourselves out on the right path toward decriminalizing
polygamy.
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